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The Great South Asian War

Michael Klare

War Research at Stanford

**SIDESTEPPING
THE MILITANTS**

Larry Schwartz

Food Additives

**SECRETARY FINCH
IS NOT ALARMED**

Jean Carper

IDEOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Wm. Appleman Williams / 'The Death of the Past'

Bruce Mazlish / 'The Political Sciences'

Norman Birnbaum / 'The Decline of Radicalism'

LETTERS

telephone static

Washington, D.C.

Dear Sirs: Your issue of Feb. 16 contains an article about our rate case in Maryland ["The Bell System Kicks the Press," by Joseph C. Goulden] which states that "Bell tried to slip a new customer inconvenience—and price increase—past the Maryland press and public."

This is a false statement. In a hearing before the Maryland commission on Feb. 11, I made the following statement to the commission, speaking as attorney for the company:

Before turning our attention to those proposals, I would like to make a brief reference to the operator handling charges which were in effect from January 16, 1970 until January 28, 1970. . . . The impression has been spread abroad that full attention was not given to operator handling charges in the proceedings leading up to the commission's order dated January 14, 1970.

Nothing could be further from the truth. I would like to explain this in detail, although as briefly as possible.

The company's filing with this commission on November 21, 1969, clearly set forth the proposed operator handling charges. This was clearly brought out in newspaper stories about the company's filing as reported in at least forty-two newspapers. . . .

In the public hearings before this commission we find that the charges are fully described in company exhibit No. 17-A at pages 20 to 21, and in company exhibit No. 17-B, in statement 11.

The financial effects of these changes are set out in company exhibit 17-F, under tab. 6. Testimony regarding these charges will be found at transcript pages 4722, 6247 to 6259, 6270 to 6271, 6321 to 6322, 6447 to 6450, and 6460 to 6464. . . .

News stories reporting the operator handling charges in the approved rates then appeared in at least forty-eight newspapers and quite possibly there are others which I do not have. . . .

How much truth is there in the article which you printed? This much: a reporter whom you identify wrote a story without getting the facts straight. . . .

Howard C. Anderson, Vice President and General Counsel
The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Companies

Arlington, Va.

Dear Sirs: The article to which Mr. Anderson objects pointed out that although the new "operator handling charges" represented \$2.6 million of a \$22.7 million rate increase, they were not mentioned (a) by Maryland Public Service Commission officials at an Annapolis press conference called on Jan. 14 to explain C&P's new rate structure; nor (b) by a C&P press agent who was queried specifically on changes by reporters for *The Washington Post* and *Washington Star*—papers which, because of the Baltimore press strike, had the largest Maryland circulations. The article concluded with a recommendation that Statehouse reporters rely upon the record, however voluminous it may be, and not press handouts, in reporting Bell System rate matters. Mr. Anderson's protestation of full disclosure must be weighed against the sequel to the story: when the *Post* belatedly reported the operator handling charges, such a consumer clatter arose that the PSC reopened the case and drastically reduced the fees.

Joseph C. Goulden

EDITORIALS

Once Again Laos

Laotian ground forces are reported to have offered only feeble resistance as Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops once again overran the strategically important Plain of Jars, a highway and airway nexus. First reports were that the North Vietnamese forces involved in the assault on the airfield located on the Plain numbered six battalions, or about 3,000 men. This was later scaled down to 400 "commandos." The Laotian retreat was attributed to "battle fatigue," a malady which has been known to attack Laotian troops in the past even before they went into battle.

American air power has been active, however. B-52s have been dropping 1,500 tons of bombs a day on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and have also been giving direct support to Laotian troops in the Plain of Jars area. A diplomatic source in Saigon is quoted to the effect that the North Vietnamese strategy in the Plain is "disturbingly reminiscent of Dienbienphu." In *The Two Vietnams*, the late Bernard Fall shows that the French had illusions about "Vietnamization" long before the Americans claimed to have invented that will-o'-the-wisp. The enemy set up strong positions in the hills and then moved in on positions the French and indigenous troops were occupying in lower terrain. It would not be surprising if, in late summer or during the fall, the North Vietnamese try a similar maneuver.

In the meantime, back in Washington, the Senate is still sparring with the White House over the heavily censored transcript of the hearings on Laos. Precisely now, when we seem to be getting ourselves mired in Laos as we did in Vietnam, and the public is most acutely in need of information, we are being kept in the dark. According to some reports, we have about 5,000 men in Laos in various guises. In sending the Southeast Asia military requests to the Congress, the President did not include Sen. Frank Church's proviso against the use of ground combat troops in Laos and Thailand. The Pentagon, it is known, was not at all happy about this proviso.

Fortunately "the flag of warning" has been raised in the Senate with an excellent leadoff speech by Sen. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R., Md.), and with supporting speeches by Republicans Cooper and Percy, and Democrats Mansfield, Gore and Symington. In contrast to the passivity of Congress during the years of escalation in Vietnam, the Senate shows its alertness to the dangers of the Laos involvement, knows what is actually going on, and appears determined to discharge its constitutional responsibilities. When last fall the Pathet Lao forces were driven from the Plain of Jars the action was hailed as a "victory," but the effect was merely to set the stage for their recapture of the area. Escalation, as Senator Mansfield notes, breeds escalation. Last fall's

"victory" is today's "deteriorating situation." As a consequence, not merely is the Laotian war being intensified but "Vietnamization" of the other war is endangered.

The President may believe, or hope, that our bombing operations in the present fighting between Laotian government troops on one side, and the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese on the other, will warn the North Vietnamese that he may order a resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam if they persist in these incursions. But the North Vietnamese generals and officials have never shown much willingness to retreat before veiled threats, and at this juncture they appear to hold the initiative.

Mr. Nixon should order the release of the Senate transcript. The key question is: what are our commitments in Laos? Some Senators have this information, but the public does not. There is no objection to deletions that may contain information of value to hostile forces, as long as the public is told whether or not Laos is to be another Vietnam. The President has made political mileage with his purported intention of withdrawing from Vietnam. One of his favorite rhetorical embellishments is, "I want to make this perfectly clear." Clarity in respect to Laos is now in order.

Battling Mitchell vs. the Media

One could almost hear the sigh of relief that issued from a large section of the networks and the press when stern John Mitchell, next to Spiro Agnew the Nixon Administration's toughest spokesman, assured them that, owing to a "failure of communications," those threatening subpoenas about which we wrote some time back (editorial, February 16) were all a mistake. Henceforth no subpoenas would be issued "without a good-faith attempt by the Department of Justice to reach a compromise acceptable to both parties."

Only those eager to grasp at straws could find reassurance in the wording of this statement. The Attorney General of the United States carries a formidable club—even when he lacks the narrowed eyes and bitter mouth of the incumbent—and nobody in his senses is overjoyed at the prospect of "negotiating" with his office. It is to be noted, moreover, that Mitchell speaks of an "acceptable" compromise—a very elastic term.

Looking back, the sequence starts with the Vice President's pistol-whipping of the media, an assault which they did not expect and from which as yet they show no sign of recovering. *Time* (February 16) quotes a political writer for a major West Coast paper: "Buried in our subconscious is the thought: 'Be goddam careful. Don't start a beef.'" One can be sure that this writer is not alone in his uneasiness; and how incisively can a political commentator pound his typewriter while looking over his shoulder?

If Agnew's castigations (delivered always before

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partisan Republican audiences) were Round 1 in the process of softening up the media, the flood of subpoenas emanating from Justice (without of course the knowledge or consent of kindly John Mitchell) could be accounted Round 2. Now, after all of Mitchell's assurances of devotion to a free press, printed and electronic, Round 3 is in progress. Mike Wallace and his producer, Paul Loewenwater, both of C.B.S. News, received telephone calls from the Justice Department during the week of February 16 seeking their testimony before a grand jury sitting in New Haven.

Wallace and Loewenwater had been responsible for a segment of a January 6 C.B.S.-TV program dealing with the Black Panthers. Wallace, a top TV newsman and gadfly, had interviewed the fugitive Panther leader, Eldridge Cleaver, in Algiers. The Justice Department has a tape of the broadcast, but they want more. Wallace does not scare easily, which is one reason why his stuff is informative and attracts a large following. "I can't believe that I could give them a good deal of help if I had a mind to," he says. "And I don't have a mind to. . . ."

Jay Topkis, a New York lawyer retained by C.B.S. on behalf of Wallace and Loewenwater, says his clients will appear if subpoenaed, but will not answer questions. Richard S. Salant, president of C.B.S. News, expressed dismay over the government's action. "This is hardly the way to give us any reassurance," he commented.

A parallel move is the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee's subpoenaing of the bank records of the Liberation News Service, which mails a semi-weekly compilation of news and opinion to 300 publications, many of them "underground" newspapers. The chairman and chief counsel, respectively, of the subcommittee are our old friends Sen. James O. Eastland and J. G. Sourwine. A temporary restraining order by a federal judge in New York has blocked the bank from producing the records. It is hardly likely that the big media will spring to the defense of Liberation News Service, although it is a foregone conclusion that Mr. Eastland is working with the Justice Department in this inquiry, and they may be next.

Fortune, the polar opposite of Liberation News Service, has in fact also been fighting a subpoena, in connection with an interview with James J. Ling, the noted conglomerate builder, whose Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., is being pressed by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department to divest itself of the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. The use by the Justice Department of the published interview is entirely in order, but the subpoena also calls for the writer's interview notes, his tape recordings, any documents furnished by Mr. Ling, and the successive drafts of the article before the final version was published. In a letter to the president of Time, Inc., which publishes *Fortune*, Mr. Mitchell expressed regret and renewed his assurances of negotiating such issues, but in the meantime a Justice Department official had

obtained the written material through what was said to be a misunderstanding.

The Nation will not be surprised if there are further instances in which reporters for the media are harassed by bureaucrats and legislators, these assaults being coupled with assurances from high up in the Administration that no harm is intended. Some of the reporters will resist, but will their bosses? If the Administration's purpose is to make sure that the media will never be in a position to accuse it of a "credibility gap," the success of its tactics will be determined by the stands taken by newspapers, magazines and the major broadcasting companies in the immediate future.

Justice Murtagh's Formula

Supreme Court Justice John M. Murtagh has postponed indefinitely the trial of the New York Panthers, with a proviso that trial can be resumed on short notice if a request to do so is submitted by the defense and accompanied by each defendant's assurance that he will give complete respect to the Court and is prepared to participate in a trial conducted under the American system of criminal justice. Part of the merit of this "formula," Justice Murtagh believes, is its "utter simplicity."

But it may not prove to be as simple as he imagines. Postponement for a reasonable period, so that the defendants may decide on their future course of conduct is probably constitutional; but it is not clear that a trial can be indefinitely postponed even if an option remains open to the defense. As a preliminary action, the judge might well have ordered the courtroom cleared with the exception of defendants, counsel and the press. With the "audience" removed, the "psycho-drama" might have abated.

What is clear is that an astonishing built-in weakness of the judicial process has been disclosed, perhaps for the first time. In a system of criminal justice based on due process, the submissiveness of the defendant—his willingness to be tried—is assumed. Due process is the *quid pro quo* for submissiveness. And the danger is that all "formulas" to combat disruptive courtroom tactics are, in one degree or another, unsatisfactory, so what is in jeopardy is not merely the defendant's rights—his freedom—but due process itself. In this instance, the judge may dismiss the pending pretrial motions as "frivolous," after a reasonable period of waiting for a response from the Panthers, and then order the trial to proceed. Thus a defendant might be forced to go to trial under circumstances where some of the procedural safeguards of due process had been forfeited.

A counter "formula" might well be: stop these conspiracy political trials, which are in themselves of doubtful constitutionality and by their very nature convert courtrooms into political arenas. It is no secret that the Department of Justice decided some time back "to get the Panthers" by one means or another and has been urging local law enforcement

officials to proceed against them. Such a policy is calculated to incite violent reaction. How can a defendant be asked to respect a system of criminal justice that is being consciously used "to get" him?

Dropping these venomous political prosecutions would be the course of wisdom, the more so since disruptive courtroom tactics are merely one symptom of the widespread attack on the legitimacy of most of the institutions of this society as now constituted. Repression will not abate this rebellion; on the contrary raising the level of repression will increase its force. In this day, institutions will be challenged if they are perverse. If the judicial system permits itself to be used as a means of repressing rather than protecting the rights of individuals, it will be resisted; "formulas," however "simple," will not abate the attack.

The Violence Trap

The *Los Angeles Times* of February 13 carries a story of exceptional interest from Meridian, Miss., under the by-line of Jack Nelson. Nelson, as we have reminded our readers from time to time, is one of the top reporters covering the South (recently he has been transferred to the *Times's* Washington Bureau). He is the kind of reporter who will return to a story as many times as he deems necessary to develop the full implications.

Nelson's story, "Police Arrange Trap: Klan Terror Is Target," is in fact an extension of an earlier series of stories about events which took place in June 1968 and earlier. There had been a series of bombings and burnings, seventeen in all, in the Jackson and Meridian areas of Mississippi in 1967 and 1968. The FBI and the local police were unable to catch the terrorists—a common difficulty in bombing, since most of the "evidence" is usually destroyed by the crime itself.

At first most of the attacks were directed against Negro churches and homes, but in the fall of 1967 the bombing of a synagogue and a rabbi's house aroused the Jewish community. The White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan were under suspicion, not only for the crimes but for committing nine murders and 300 other acts of violence—bombings, burnings and beatings. The FBI had recordings in which a Klansman was quoted in connection with plans for blowing up synagogues full of people, including women and children. "Little Jews grow up to be big Jews," the Klansman said in the reports made public about the contents of the recording. "Kill them while they are young."

The only way to stop the wave of terror, so the police and FBI reasoned, was to use provocateurs and set a trap by inducing the terrorists to bomb premises which the police could stake out in advance. Funds were raised from private sources to pay the price the infiltrators demanded.

Two White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan were paid

\$36,500. A former FBI agent who acted as intermediary received \$2,600. The informers, Raymond and Alton Wayne Roberts, were themselves involved in federal civil rights cases. Alton Wayne Roberts is under a ten-year sentence in connection with the murder of three civil rights workers in Philadelphia, Miss., in 1967, and his case is now on appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court. The brothers received, in addition to the \$36,500, written assurance against prosecution in several cases of church bombings.

The trap set was the bombing of the house of a Jewish businessman. It was expected that two men would do the job. At the last minute one of the informers learned that instead a 26-year-old woman, Mrs. Kathy Ainsworth, would accompany a male White Knight, Thomas Albert Tarrants III. Raymond Roberts telephoned this information to the police, but the decision was made to spring the trap anyway. At this point, the police knew nothing of Mrs. Ainsworth's Klan background.

The police account is that Tarrants drove up with Mrs. Ainsworth and got out of his car with a bomb made of twenty-nine sticks of dynamite in one hand and a drawn revolver in the other. Called on to halt, he fired at the police. Tarrants says he was fired on without warning. In the ensuing exchange of shots Mrs. Ainsworth was killed, and Tarrants, a bystander and a policeman were wounded. Tarrants was sentenced to thirty years for his part in the bombing attempt.

Mrs. Ainsworth was a school teacher without a police record. After her death she was found to have been a member of the White Knights, but the FBI produced no evidence linking her to any crime except the one into which she was drawn by Tarrants, acting at the instigation of the Roberts brothers.

To date, silence has surrounded publication of the story, which is fully detailed. Neither the FBI nor the Department of Justice has offered any comment. In one of the few editorials evoked by the story, the *Delta Democrat-Times* of Greenville, Miss., points out its frightening aspects:

The question the article indirectly raises is whether local or federal lawmen went outside the law to punish men they could not punish in a courtroom. The larger question is whether the FBI has used similar techniques elsewhere and whether this mode of operation has official sanction at the highest level of government. Many Americans are undoubtedly not disturbed by the Meridian story. To them Tarrants was a mad dog who deserved anything he got. . . . But where does this process once begun ever end? Are lawmen to act as police, judge, jury, and executioner? Who then decides who should be killed in a different kind of trap and who should not? An Albert Tarrants here, a New Leftist there, perhaps a Black Panther in yet another place—and finally why not Mr. Middle American?

These are deeply disturbing questions—or they should be—but even more disturbing has been the failure to date of the press, public and official Washington to react to the dangerous implications of Mr. Nelson's disclosures.

Secretary Finch Is Not Alarmed

JEAN CARPER

Miss Carper is co-author with Sen. Warren G. Magnuson of a syndicated newspaper column on consumer protection and of a book on consumer problems, *The Dark Side of the Marketplace* (Prentice-Hall).

Nearly everyone who can be heard is still telling us that cyclamates won't hurt us much. A medical columnist recently pooh-poohed a mother's fears that cyclamate-content vitamins might harm her child. Helen Gurley Brown told *Cosmopolitan* readers, in girl-to-girl confidence, that she was so depressed by the cyclamate ban that she ran right out and stocked up on cases of cyclamate-sweetened fruits and soft drinks. Grocers, just before the January 1 ban, sloughed off thousands of cases of cyclamate soda pop at \$1 a case. The Lipton Tea Company donated 15,000 cases of its excess supply of cyclamate-sweetened instant tea to mental institutions and prisons in Ohio. The company said its charity was prompted by the fact it didn't "believe it was marketable." Even Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Robert Finch wrote a poem about it for the amusement of the National Press Club:

*Damage in brains, mutations and cancer
Who in the world can give us the answer?
Chromosome breaks, chick malformation,
Pot and pollution and desegregation,
So revising Delaney should just be a cinch—
But why in the hell must it always be Finch?*

Despite the levity of Secretary Finch and his inner circle of advisers, the situation is not funny. That danger from cyclamates is very real is attested to by respected scientists both inside and outside the Food and Drug Administration. Yet from the very beginning the government guardians of the food supply treated it as if it were a bad joke. Finch, for example, when he was "forced" to ban cyclamates under a 1958 amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, sponsored by Rep. James Delaney of New York, was described by one journalist as "looking for all the world like Pontius Pilate calling for a washbasin and towel." Finch at his press conference said apologetically, "I have acted under the provisions of the law because . . . I am required to do so." The Delaney clause says a food additive can no longer be classified as "generally recognized as safe" if it causes cancer when ingested by man or animal. Cyclamate produced bladder cancer when fed to rats in a study sponsored by Abbott Laboratories, the leading producer of cyclamate.

HEW officials let it be known they thought enforcing this law was a lot of poppycock. Dr. Roger Egeberg, HEW's assistant secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs and "everyone's family physician"

according to Finch, went before a Harvard Medical School audience to say that he didn't think cyclamates were anything to be alarmed about; that he would advise his own daughter to stock up on diet drinks before they were outlawed. Other top HEW officials minimized the danger to the point of making alarm seem panicky. Eventually, the ban was weakened to allow cyclamate on the market, as a nonprescription drug in "special purpose foods," ostensibly for diabetics and the obese, provided that the products carry a warning—which they did even before the partial ban. So we're right back where everyone can buy cyclamate foods if he wishes—except that soft drinks remain totally banned.

Such irresponsible government handling of the situation would be reprehensible enough if it involved only cyclamate. But the real damage done by HEW is much broader, for it has given the public a false conception of the potential danger not only of cyclamate but of the tons of other additives that are cavalierly dumped in the food supply—usually without any testing at all. Through a steady stream of misinformation, HEW has muddled the basic issues which are bound to come up time and again in assessing the safety of food additives, and which the public must understand if it is to make intelligent judgments. Therefore, it is important to take a look at the myths HEW has fostered through its handling of cyclamate:

Myth: Animal studies that involve high doses of a chemical are meaningless to man.

Fact: Much was made of the fact that the rats fed cyclamate were given "excessively" high doses of the chemical—fifty times the human consumption level. Taking a cue from Finch's original press conference in which he labeled the doses as "strong" and "high," many writers misinterpreted the meaning of the dosage and publicized it in high ridicule. One syndicated science writer figured that "to take aboard as much cyclamate as the rats do, solely by drinking low-cal soda pop, a man would have to swill down several dozen cases every day for the better part of his human life span. He would die not of cancer but the bloat."

The fact of the matter is that, far from being a high dose in animal experiments, fifty times the human consumption level is extraordinarily low; doses twice that high are the scientific norm. As Dr. Umberto Saffiotti, associate scientific director for carcinogenesis at the National Cancer Institute explains: high doses are scientifically necessary to try to pick up all the possible human variabilities from a comparatively few rats. He says: "Since you can't test millions of animals, to detect in small numbers

of animals the level of effect comparable to what is expected in man, you have to use maximum tolerated doses. If a chemical produces cancer in 50 per cent of the animals at a high dose level and if this is taken by man in amounts fifty times less, we could expect that in man it might produce a 1 per cent incidence of cancer, and in man that's quite a number of cases—2 million. So the factor of one in fifty is a low safety factor—half the 100 times higher dose level which is usually accepted as the minimum in acute toxicity.”

This knowledge was not hidden from Finch. Dr. Saffiotti was, after all, one of Finch's chief advisers in urging the cyclamate ban and reviewed the rat-cancer data from Abbott.

Myth: Even if a food additive is found to be a carcinogen, it is safe to eat in small amounts.

Fact: Once a substance is proved to be carcinogenic, authorities worldwide agree there is no way to set safe tolerances. No one knows just how little of a chemical may trigger the onset of cancer. Moreover, tiny doses of a carcinogen taken here and there may be dangerous because of a cumulative effect in the body. A whiff of polluted air here, a bite of contaminated food there, a puff on a cigarette, etc., and the so-called “safe” dosages could add up to a lethal dose. A report from a committee of international scientists for the World Health Organization was unequivocal on this point: “The uncertainty of the extrapolation of the safe dose to man, and lack of knowledge of the possible summing or potentiating effects of different carcinogens in the total human environment, preclude the establishment of a safe dose at the present time on grounds of prudence.” So with all proper respect to the jocular Dr. Egeberg, our nation's family physician, there is no such thing as eating with safety a little bit of a known carcinogen.

Myth: If we don't have evidence that a food additive is injurious to human beings, we can assume that it is safe.

Fact: During the cyclamate controversy, this blatantly misleading inference was ballyhooed by both HEW officials and industry spokesmen. Dr. Jesse Steinfeld, HEW deputy assistant for Health and Scientific Affairs, emphasized to reporters: “There is absolutely no evidence to demonstrate in any way that the use of cyclamate has caused cancer in man.” He also used data from Connecticut to show that “we have no indication that human bladder cancer from whatever cause is increasing to any significant degree.”

Of course, we don't have evidence that cyclamate has caused cancer in humans. If we did, God help us. The situation would be disastrous. For cyclamates have been in widespread use for only seven years—since 1963—and it takes at least fifteen to twenty years for cancer to develop. If cyclamate were such a potent carcinogen that it could produce a statistical rise in cancer in only seven years, we

would—as Dr. Saffiotti puts it—“be in the middle of an epidemic of incredible proportions.”

As a point of accuracy, Dr. Steinfeld had his Connecticut figures wrong, and his error was unfortunately widely quoted to prove the “safety” of cyclamate, even though it proved nothing. Bladder cancer among males in Connecticut has in fact *doubled* during the last two decades, although the death rate from the disease has not risen, presumably because of better treatment. Nevertheless—and this illustrates the danger of the predicament—the cancer increase couldn't be linked to cyclamate or to any other single food additive. For when an entire population is being dosed with thousands of additives, who can tell which might be causing what? Or whether the cause might not be another factor altogether? Even in the case of thalidomide, where the deformities were grossly observable and the drug was being taken by a specific population (pregnant women), it was five years before the link between the two could be established. With food additives, it would be virtually impossible to prove a cause-effect relationship by looking for damage in the population. It is essential with additives—even more than with drugs—to rely on clues provided by animal studies.

Myth: It is absurd to get upset over damage from animal studies, because animals are different from man and nearly any chemical if fed in large enough amounts to animals will cause cancer.

Fact: No one would claim that animal studies are foolproof indicators of human danger. Animals may be more susceptible or less susceptible than man. However, neither is it fair to say that the results of such studies cannot be extrapolated to man, as HEW officials consistently pretended during the cyclamate controversy. Secretary Finch publicly dismissed studies done by Dr. Jacqueline Verrett and Dr. Marvin Legator, Food and Drug Administration scientists, which showed, respectively, that cyclamate produced deformed chick embryos and broken chromosomes in rats. He said their results couldn't be applied to human beings.

The government seems to have respect for animal studies that show *no* evidence of harm and thus prove an additive or drug to be “safe.” Such studies are accepted routinely by the FDA from manufacturers wanting to market a new drug or food additive. It is only when the studies produce an inconvenient result that they become suddenly worthless. Such was the case when Dr. Herbert L. Ley, then FDA commissioner, appeared in July 1969 before Sen. George McGovern's committee on nutrition to testify to the *safety* of monosodium glutamate. Among other studies, Dr. Ley cited one by Dr. Verrett that produced no deformities in chick embryos from injections of MSG. This, he implied, helped prove the chemical's safety. Dr. Verrett was incensed. She had explicitly stated that the study was inconclusive because it involved only 180 eggs—

"hardly enough to make an omelet"—in her words.

Yet when Dr. Verrett came up with her startling findings that egg injections of cyclamate produced gross deformities in embryos, including thalidomide-like "flippers," after a complete study of 13,000 eggs, she was publicly slapped down by Secretary Finch and Dr. Ley for insubordination and exaggeration. In interviews with reporters and in a press conference Finch criticized Dr. Verrett for "going directly to the press" (she had appeared on N.B.C. television), and made it clear her studies had nothing to do with the ban. In truth, Dr. Verrett's TV appearance had been cleared by the FDA press office and by Deputy Commissioner Winton B. Rankin's office. And since December 1968, she had been writing memos to her superiors, including Ley, alerting them to her findings. But, as she found out, studies that show harm apparently do not receive the same attention around FDA as do studies that show no harm.

In interpreting animal studies, it is important to recognize also that they do not always err on the side of protection. It is possible, says one scientist, that a weak carcinogen could escape detection in animal studies and yet catastrophically affect as many as one out of 10,000 of the population. Nor can animals display subtle chemical-caused deformities such as functional brain damage. In addition, animals may not be as sensitive as man to a certain chemical. Test after test with rats failed to reveal embryonic damage from thalidomide. It was possible finally to produce deformities, though not as great as those in human beings, in certain strains of rabbits. Conversely, the gross skeletal deformities caused by cyclamate in Dr. Verrett's chick embryos might be translated in men and women as more subtle or lesser defects—cleft palate, ear and eye damage, mental retardation, impairment of the heart, spleen, thyroid, pancreas, bone marrow. As Dr. Joshua Lederberg, Nobel Laureate and professor of genetics at Stanford, points out, any indication of damage in any animal must be taken seriously: "There is no basis for the illusion that a compound that can cause harm in other living cells will not affect human cells."

There is also no truth to the widespread misconception that any chemical fed to animals in high enough doses will cause cancer. Subcutaneous injections of chemicals do frequently produce cancer, but it is unusual in the case of *ingested* chemicals. In a recent study done by Bionetics Research Laboratories, only 25 per cent of 120 compounds fed to mice in the *highest* doses they could tolerate without dying, resulted in tumors.

Myth: The Delaney clause is unscientific, restrictive and should be scrapped or weakened.

Fact: The Delaney clause is our best protection, for from Secretary Finch's own testimony we can assume that, had it not been for this clause, we would

all be guzzling cyclamate to this day. Finch, in fact, did not have to rely on the Delaney clause; under general FDA authority he could have banned cyclamates on the basis of Dr. Verrett's or Dr. Legator's studies.

Recently, without fanfare, the FDA removed brominated vegetable oils, a food stabilizer, from the GRAS ("generally recognized as safe") list, because it is suspected of causing heart injuries. This was comparatively easy, because brominated vegetable oils were not an economic bombshell; but the cyclamate market was over \$1 billion a year, and apparently HEW can't get up the courage to attack the big boys, however hazardous their product, without the backbone provided by the Delaney clause.

Opponents of the clause maintain it is unscientific, since any test claiming to have caused cancer, no matter how poorly done or inappropriate, could force a perfectly safe additive off the market. That is untrue. Dr. Saffiotti, among other scientists, points out that there is plenty of room for scientific judgment, because expert scientists (like himself in the case of cyclamate) must decide whether or not the additive has *caused* the cancer through ingestion, and to do that they must make sure the test methods are sound.

We have only begun to appreciate the dimensions of the risk in the indiscriminate use of food additives. Every year each of us consumes about three pounds of additives, most of which have never been tested in animals for possible harm. They have been put on the GRAS list because someone—industry or physicians—termed them safe, or never saw any evidence that they are unsafe. An internal FDA memo last October listed twenty-three additives on the GRAS list which FDA scientists have good reason to suspect are dangerous, plus 350 others on which the evidence of safety is admittedly "inadequate." These suspect additives remain in constant use while the FDA ponders the situation.

What testing has been done has centered mostly on imminent diseases, mostly cancer. But Dr. Lederberg believes a far more insidious threat, which has received little testing attention, is the risk of birth defects and long-range mutations. He says the present reckless policy on additives could create undesirable mutations that might not become noticeable for 100 years or more, if they were ever spotted. Such effects could be subtle: a lowering of intelligence, a loss of physical vigor, sterility—in short "a general reduction in the viability of succeeding generations similar to what we would expect from radioactive fallout." Instead of weakening the Delaney clause, Dr. Lederberg and a number of other leading scientists believe it should be expanded to demand the automatic removal from the market of any additive shown to cause birth defects or genetic damage in animals or man.

The guiding policy of the government, as of the food and drug industry, is that additives do not have

to be proved reasonably safe by industry *before* they are used. The attitude is, go ahead and use them and let's see if damage shows up in the human guinea pigs. More outrageous, with food we don't even have the opportunity to exercise an option of "informed consent" as we do with drugs. The additives are

dumped into everyone's food, and we eat them without knowing it. It appears that we shall need a considerable strengthening of the law—along the lines urged by Dr. Lederberg—if we are to avoid the systematic poisoning of ourselves and our descendants. □

THE GREAT SOUTH ASIAN WAR

MICHAEL KLARE

Mr. Klare, a staff member of the North American Congress on Latin America, is completing a book on counterinsurgency planning in the United States.

To gain a world-historical perspective on the war in Vietnam, one must see it as but one episode in a Great South Asian War that began almost immediately after World War II, and can be expected to continue into the 1970s, if not well beyond them. The Great War has already encompassed the Indo-Chinese War of Independence (1946-54), the guerrilla war in Malaya (1948-60), intermittent warfare in Laos (continuing), guerrilla skirmishes in Thailand (continuing), and other armed struggles in Burma, Malaysia and Indonesia. Combatants in these conflicts have included, in addition to troops of the countries named, the armies of Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Nationalist China and, of course, the United States.

These episodes constitute a common war not only because they occupy overlapping zones in a single theatre of war but also because they spring from a common cause: the determination of the advanced industrial nations of the West (led by the United States) to intensify their control over the destinies of the underdeveloped lands of Asia. The Western presence in South Asia is naturally a military and economic challenge to Communist China, whose real or imagined influence has been a factor in each of these struggles. But it is not the threat of Chinese bellicosity that lends unity to all these episodes; it is rather the determination of the region's indigenous peoples to secure a future that will be free of foreign control. Because the nations of South Asia are frozen in a state of underdevelopment, and because national boundaries (which, more often than not, were established by European powers) do not always conform to ethnic distribution, these conflicts often take the form of "insurgencies"—i.e., local struggles against centralized authority—and the response to them has been a succession of "counterinsurgencies." Although the doctrine of counterinsurgency was originally formulated to substitute a strategy of "limited warfare" for the obsolete strategies of "all-out" (i.e., nuclear) warfare, in South Asia counterinsurgency threatens to become *unlimited* in its duration.

At the end of World War II, the United States and its allies in Western Europe agreed to sanction the re-establishment of one another's spheres of influence in Asia. The United States, having conquered Japan, was to be dominant in the western Pacific (China, Japan, the Philippines, etc.); France would remain in Indo-China, and Britain in the Indian Ocean area (India, Burma, Malaya, Singapore, etc.). The Allies also apportioned responsibility for the maintenance of a defense perimeter, corresponding to their colonial holdings, which encircled the eastern half of Asia from Korea to Kashmir, and pledged to assist one another if any point on the perimeter came under heavy attack. This "gentleman's agreement" was soon put to the test, for the restoration of colonial regimes in South Asia (revoking wartime promises of independence) produced guerrilla warfare throughout the region. Several countries won their independence this way, where continued occupation would have been unprofitable (Burma) or beyond the capacity of the home economy (Indonesia). But in Southeast Asia proper, the colonialists were prepared to engage in protracted counterinsurgency struggles to maintain their control of the area's resources. In Malaya it took Britain (with the aid of Australia and Gurkha tribesmen) twelve years to force the last remnants of the Malayan Races Liberation Army across the border into Thailand. In Indo-China, France faced an even more formidable foe. In 1950, confronted with a deteriorating military situation in Vietnam and growing discontent at home, France appealed to the United States to honor its commitment and help prevent a breach of the Asian defense perimeter. Although the United States had already deployed its troops in South Korea to protect the northern flank of the perimeter, it nevertheless agreed to supply France with arms and badly needed funds (the total U.S. contributions to the French military struggle in Indo-China amounted to \$2.6 billion, or 80 per cent of the cost of the war).

Despite this help, the Viet Minh won at Dienbienphu, and the French army withdrew from Southeast Asia, leaving a substantial military vacuum at the mid-point of the Asian defense perimeter. The United States—which until this time had considered Southeast Asia to be of secondary importance to its Pacific territories—quickly moved in. The French colonial


apparatus had not completed its removal from Saigon when America's first paramilitary legions began arriving. To circumvent the Geneva Accords, which prohibited the introduction of new weapons or foreign military personnel into Vietnam, the Michigan State University Group (MSUG) was established to provide a "cover" for the CIA team which armed and trained Ngo Dinh Diem's secret police and palace guard. The gradual intensification of U.S. military activity in Vietnam—from the arrival of the first Special Forces "advisers" to the deployment of a half-million-man army—is too familiar to need repeating. Less familiar, perhaps, is the history of U.S. involvement in Laos and Thailand; it is only in the past few months, in fact, that the public has learned that the United States maintains a substantial—and active—military establishment in Laos, and that we are bound to the Bangkok government by secret military protocols. Despite the well-publicized U.S. troop withdrawals from South Vietnam, U.S. military activity in Southeast Asia has actually *increased* in the past few months, with most of this increase taking place in Laos.

During his recent eleven-nation tour of Asia, Vice

President Spiro Agnew stated in Australia that "despite a great deal of speculation and rumor, the United States is not withdrawing from Asia and the Pacific." Thanks to the assiduous journalism of a few "Establishment" newspapers—particularly those which have come under attack from Mr. Agnew—there can no longer be any denying that the U.S. war effort in Vietnam has "spilled over" into the rest of Southeast Asia. What is *not* known by most Americans is that the Pentagon is now preparing for combat operations in the neighboring regions of South Asia.

On January 16, 1968, Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that Great Britain would withdraw all its troops stationed east of the Suez Canal by the end of 1971. British bases in Asia—located in Singapore, Malaysia and several Persian Gulf sites—formed the backbone of a defense line extending across the entire Indian Ocean area. Britain's impending withdrawal from this region produced consternation in Washington, where it had always been assumed that the English could be counted upon to protect America's western flank in Asia. One U.S. strategist, James D. Atkinson, wrote: "For almost a century

ASIAN DEFENSE PERIMETER, 1945-71



the vast Red Sea-Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean complex was an area of relative stability. This was so because . . . British forces were on hand throughout these sea spaces and able to respond quickly for any needed police actions." With Britain no longer willing to perform this police function, the Pentagon began making plans to assume responsibility for defense of the Indian Ocean area. These preparations—including the acquisition of new bases and the development of new combat capabilities—have been artfully camouflaged in Defense Department statements, with the result that very few Americans know that such plans exist. Nevertheless, it can be shown that the United States is developing the ability to fight a naval war in the Indian Ocean or a land war on the peaks of the Himalayas.

The military does not plan in a milieu devoid of political and economic considerations; before proceeding with a discussion of U.S. military strategy in South Asia it is necessary, therefore, to investigate the principal nonmilitary factors which have determined the limits of that strategy.


The Pacific-Indian Ocean area has achieved parity with Latin America and Europe as an outlet for U.S. trade and investment. According to the Commerce Department, U.S. trade with Asia and Oceania amounted to \$12.9 billion in 1967, compared with \$9.4 billion in Latin America and \$18.5 billion in Europe. Direct U.S. investment in this area is only \$6.8 billion, the comparable figures for Latin America and Europe being \$10.3 billion and \$17.9 billion, but earnings are unusually high: \$1.7 billion in 1968, compared with \$1.4 billion for Latin America and only \$1.3 billion for Europe. While trade with Japan (America's leading trading partner after Canada) accounts for a large bulk of U.S. commerce in the Pacific, our economic relations with other Asian countries are growing steadily. To be sure, the current boom in favored Pacific countries is largely the result of Vietnamese War spending—Japan, Okinawa, South Korea and the Philippines all provide essential goods and services for the U.S. forces, and profit handsomely from our installations on their territory. But long-term investments—particularly in mining and oil refining—indicate that U.S. economic interest in the area will grow.

Closer examination of trade and investment data suggests that the center of gravity of U.S. economic activity in Asia is shifting southwestward, from the North Pacific to Southeast Asia, Australia and Indonesia (thus following the line of military advance sketched above). Although direct American trade and investment in the Indian Ocean has not increased as rapidly as in the Pacific, the region is a principal market for countries like Australia and Japan whose economies, through the agency of "multinational corporations," are becoming increasingly linked to that of the United States. Furthermore, the Indian Ocean itself has acquired considerable strate-

gic importance (particularly since the closing of the Suez Canal) as a major sea route for oil. The Middle East's abundant fields now supply 50 per cent of the oil imports of Western Europe, 90 per cent of Japan's, 65 per cent of Australia's, and 83 per cent of Africa's (as well as most of the oil used by the United States in Vietnam). Some of it is carried by pipe line to the Mediterranean, but the bulk of it goes by tanker across or around the Indian Ocean. Finally, one must never forget that the Indian Ocean borders on the second, fifth and sixth most populous countries in the world (India, Indonesia and Pakistan), whose allegiance to the West is considered a major objective of U.S. policy. If any of these countries were to undergo a Communist revolution, Western domination of the entire area would be threatened as other Asian countries readjusted their trade and political relations to accommodate the changed strategic balance.

Long-term U.S. strategy in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas can perhaps best be described as the "Latin Americanization" of South Asia—i.e., the stabilization of Asia's dependent status vis-à-vis the United States, as a supplier of raw materials and market for manufactured goods. As in other parts of the Third World, the United States has cultivated partnership arrangements with the more advanced nations in the region (in this case, Australia and Japan), in order to exploit more efficiently the resources of the whole area. Because this strategy will doom South Asia to a condition of permanent underdevelopment, and most of its inhabitants (especially those in rural areas) to a condition of permanent impoverishment, conflict is inevitable. The revolutionary tide which swept through the colonial nations after World War II has not diminished with the attainment of nominal self-rule: everywhere in the Third World rebellious peasants are demanding that their economic emancipation be postponed no longer. In Vietnam, the United States has learned at tremendous cost the hard lesson that even poor farmers—once inspired by the promise of a better life for their children—can stop the most powerful armies in the world. It has become abundantly clear that American plans for the creation of a mercantile empire in South Asia will require the continued presence and intervention of U.S. troops (or native troops under American command) for as long as one can see into the future.

This analysis is evidently shared by military planners in the Pentagon, for despite Presidential promises of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Asia following the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, the Pentagon has shown that it expects to maintain a military establishment in the area for the indefinite future. In its fiscal 1970 budget report to the Congress, the Defense Department stated that it will "be necessary for the United States to continue some form of military presence in the region for some time and this



Cartoons by Vadillo; Siempre, Mexico

must include appropriate basing arrangements." But popular disaffection with the Vietnamese War in particular, and with defense spending in general, has created a problem for Pentagon strategists. To solve it, they have evolved a three-pronged strategy that is designed to minimize direct U.S. involvement in Asia, while assuring our mastery of future guerrilla battlefields. This scheme, constituting the U.S. defense plan for the Great South Asian War, can be summarized as follows:

¶The creation of client regimes in each Asian nation, backed by the native military establishment and dependent on U.S. economic assistance for survival, which are obliged to provide indigenous troops for counterinsurgency operations planned and directed by U.S. "advisers."

¶The establishment of an "Anglo-Saxon Alliance"—the United States, New Zealand, Australia and ultimately the Union of South Africa—to protect the Asian interests of the (white) people inhabiting these former British colonies.

¶The formation of an elite counterinsurgency "fire brigade," composed of U.S. servicemen trained and equipped for combat in irregular jungle and mountain terrain, which can be flown to trouble spots in Asia from rear-area bases in the United States when serious emergencies occur.

Each of these goals will now be discussed in detail.

CLIENT REGIMES. Throughout the Third World, the United States has so manipulated the social and economic relationships of native populations as to create subgroups which place loyalty to Washington over that to their fellow countrymen. U.S. foreign aid programs, import subsidies and military grants are all designed to create in each country a privileged stratum dependent upon continued Ameri-

can beneficence for its prosperity. When such a group acquires control of the national government, the United States ultimately exercises the power. Since the ruling group remains dependent on U.S. aid even when in control of the governmental apparatus (in order to finance development projects and meet military payrolls), Washington can compel a client regime to provide troops for U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaigns. This process of cultural subversion is easily discerned in South Vietnam, but the same mechanisms prevail elsewhere in Asia, particularly in Thailand, South Korea and Laos. This arrangement affords two advantages to the United States: it reduces the need to maintain large overseas garrisons, and avoids local antagonism to the overt American presence.

In every country where U.S. funds provide a significant percentage of the military budget, native troops are being armed and trained for counter guerrilla operations. In Thailand, for instance, the U.S. military assistance program (estimated at \$100 million per year) is being used to provide the entire army of more than 100,000 men with M16 rifles, machine guns, radios and other standard light equipment designed for jungle conditions. Thai recruits are trained in their homeland by U.S. Special Forces instructors, and then sent for further "on-the-job" experience in Vietnam and Laos, where they participate in combat operations under U.S. command. Thai troops in Vietnam (now numbering 11,000) are rotated frequently, so that as many soldiers as possible acquire some familiarity with anti-guerrilla warfare. Whereas most Americans assume that these troops were brought in as a publicity gesture to "internationalize" the U.S. intervention, it is now clear that an equally important objective is to provide advanced counter guerrilla training to troops that

may some day be called upon to employ their skills in other countries (or perhaps in their own).

The Pentagon apparently prefers to concentrate its efforts on the formation of small, well-equipped and highly motivated units, rather than on large, general purpose armies made up of undisciplined recruits of questionable loyalty. Thus each country receiving substantial military aid has been obliged to create special counter guerrilla units, variously called "Rangers" or "Special Forces" after their American counterparts. They usually receive their training from Special Forces instructors, and attend special indoctrination courses developed by American social scientists. Again taking Thailand as an example, the Green Berets have helped organize the Thai Special Forces Group, a 1,000-man unit regarded by some observers as the best military force in Thailand. Crack units of this sort often develop a closer relationship to their American advisers (who, moreover, pay their salaries), than to native officers. It is not surprising, therefore, that in Vietnam, such units often outperform regular South Vietnamese troops.

Though most U.S. military assistance programs in Asia are designed to strengthen the internal security capabilities of the regular armed forces, in some instances the Pentagon and CIA have by-passed the native military establishment to create irregular military forces which operate independently of the regular army, and usually under direct U.S. command. The mercenaries who serve in these independent armies are frequently recruited from the minority groups which can be found in most South Asian countries. Many of them have suffered at the hands of the dominant ethnic group, and are thus susceptible to psychological pressure designed to turn them against guerrilla units drawn from the majority group. Thus in Vietnam the Americans created the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, made up of Montagnard tribesmen, and stationed them in border areas where they could be used for raids into Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam. A similar force, known as the Armée Clandestine and composed of Meo tribesmen, has been active in Laos since the 1950s. According to *The New York Times*, this force of 15,000 mercenaries, "is armed, equipped, fed, paid, guided strategically and tactically, and often transported into and out of action by the United States." The Armée Clandestine is commanded by CIA operatives attached to the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane, and functions independently of the Laotian High Command. It is credited with several recent victories against Pathet Lao troops, and is considered more reliable than regular Laotian units, which often retreat in the face of concerted enemy attacks.

Even the "nonmilitary" components of the U.S. foreign aid program are designed to foster the development of surrogate counter guerrilla armies in

Asia. It has been established that a major portion of funds channeled through AID are used to subsidize the police forces of many Asian nations. Approximately half of the AID budget in Thailand, for instance, is devoted to this purpose; U.S. funds are being used to construct 1,000 new police stations in rural areas (especially in the troubled Northeast), each of which is to be manned by at least twenty members of the Thai National Police or paramilitary Border Patrol Police. Before assuming their new posts, these officers will receive six weeks of counterinsurgency and jungle warfare training provided by AID's "Public Safety Advisers."

The long-range objectives of U.S. assistance programs in Asia were summed up by former Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford in an unusually candid statement to Congress on January 15, 1969:

Clearly, the overriding goal of our collective defense efforts in Asia must be to assist our allies in building a capability to defend themselves. *Besides costing substantially less (an Asian soldier costs about 1/15 as much as his American counterpart), there are compelling political and psychological advantages on both sides of the Pacific for such a policy.* [Emphasis added.] Moreover, as our experience with the South Korean Army has so well demonstrated, there are no insuperable obstacles to the development of good local land forces capable of offering a credible deterrent to a Communist aggression.

Aside from the curious remark on the dollar value of Asian soldiers, this statement is noteworthy as a straightforward expression of the policies discussed above.

ANGLO-SAXON ALLIANCE. In the alliances which the United States has contracted during the cold-war era, there exists an unspoken but evident differentiation between contracts of convenience and contracts of conviction. While the State Department may speak glowingly of U.S.-Vietnamese friendship, U.S.-Korean friendship, or U.S.-Thai friendship, there are very few countries which Washington trusts implicitly—trusts, that is, with secret military information or access to the inner circles of defense policy making. The small group of countries which do enjoy these privileges have two striking characteristics in common: they are all former colonies of Great Britain, and are all ruled by the white descendants of European immigrants. At present, this select group includes Canada, Australia and New Zealand; if the Pentagon had its way, and diplomatic considerations were set aside, the Union of South Africa would also be admitted to this exclusive club. Military officers of these favored countries routinely receive copies of secret U.S. intelligence reports, are kept informed of Pentagon work on chemical and biological warfare and other secret projects, and participate as equals in military strategy conferences. In order to cement this working relationship still more firmly, the Pentagon has initiated Project Mallard, which will ultimately provide a "joint tactical international communication

system for the armies, navies and air forces of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia." One does not share military communications channels with any but the closest allies.

Anglo-Saxon cooperation in the Pacific is guaranteed by the ANZUS Pact (Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States), which commits these countries to assist one another in the event of an attack on any one of them, or upon any of their Pacific dependencies. Australia and New Zealand are further associated with the United States as members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (the only other Asian members are Thailand and the Philippines—both heavily dependent upon U.S. military assistance). The strength of the ties which bind the military establishments of Australia and New Zealand to that of the United States is perhaps best shown by the fact that both countries have supplied combat troops for Vietnam, despite widespread domestic opposition. When Vice President Agnew arrived in Canberra, he referred to Australia's contribution to the U.S. war effort in Korea and Vietnam, and stated that in its future endeavors, Australia "will always have the unfailing support and loyal friendship of the United States of America." In a subsequent press conference, Agnew spoke of the "common English ancestry" of Australia and America. The Vice President was told by Prime Minister Gorton that "you have never been more welcome than you are here in the capital of Australia."

The close relations that developed in recent years among the United States, Australia and New Zealand spring not just from a common language and cultural heritage but also from some very real policy considerations. The United States, as said above, seeks to replace its forces in Asia with foreign troops whose loyalty to U.S. objectives can be relied upon; Australia and New Zealand, for their part, must be assured of unhampered trade with, and sea routes to, the nations bordering the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Australia, moreover, is motivated by policies of racial exclusion; like the whites of South Africa, Australians dread the traditional southward migration patterns of colored peoples, and are therefore willing to provide military assistance to their northern neighbors (Australia provides such aid to Malaysia and Singapore, just as South Africa does to Rhodesia) in order to establish a buffer zone against further migrations. These racial considerations are not incompatible with U.S. policy, which seeks to maintain Western (i.e., white) hegemony in the Pacific-Indian Ocean area. Thus in return for its promise to come to the assistance of Australia and New Zealand in any future emergencies, the United States has been invited to establish new military installations in those countries, and can expect their help in the reconstitution of the Asian defense perimeter following the withdrawal of Great Britain in 1971.

The U.S. naval operations in the South Pacific and Indian Ocean will be greatly facilitated upon completion of communications facilities in Canterbury, New Zealand, and North West Cape, Australia. These will house very low frequency (VLF) radio transmitters (for use in communicating with submerged Polaris submarines) in addition to conventional transmitters. The Canterbury station, part of the "Omega" communications system, has provoked some local opposition, but the Australian facility is well under construction. Known as U.S. Naval Communications Station Harold E. Holt (for the late Prime Minister), the North West Cape installation will house the most powerful VLF transmitter in the world.

When it is completed, the United States will have acquired the requisite communications capacity for expanded naval operations along the eastern rim of the Indian Ocean (a similar facility at Asmara, Ethiopia, performs the same role in the western part of the ocean). The operational capability of U.S. naval vessels sent to the Indian Ocean would be enhanced even further if present diplomatic sanctions against South Africa were dropped. The Navy is particularly eager to gain access to the Simons-town naval base, strategically located on the Cape of Good Hope, for refueling and repair work. The Defense Department would also like to cooperate with South Africa in the collection of intelligence data on naval and maritime activity along the coast of Africa. Although the Pentagon has heretofore spoken cautiously on this subject, a number of influential Congressman, including Sen. Strom Thurmond, are urging the White House to adopt some kind of formula for limited military cooperation (excluding internal security ventures) with South Africa.

The cooperation of Australia and New Zealand will become even more useful to the United States in December 1971 when the last British troops leave South Asia. Britain is currently pledged to provide for the defense of the Federation of Malaysia (which incorporates the former colonies of Malaya, Sarawak and North Borneo) and the island state of Singapore. These two countries, whose combined armies boast only 40,000 men and a handful of aircraft, are threatened by lingering guerrilla activity along the Thai border, by territorial disputes with the Philippines and Indonesia, and by internal racist unrest. Because of their strategic location, and the high potential for conflict, the impending British withdrawal has compelled the United States to contemplate some police role. Since, however, the stability of this area is also considered vital to the security of Australia and New Zealand, the United States will be able to leave primary defense to its Anglo-Saxon allies. Australia and New Zealand will jointly maintain a battalion each at Singapore, with one company on rotation in Malaysia. They will each station a naval vessel in the area at all times, and Australia will keep two squadrons of jet aircraft at Butterworth,

near the Thai border. Australia has also promised to supply the Malaysian Air Force with ten Sabre-jet fighters and the necessary maintenance equipment.

While neither Australia nor New Zealand—with armies of 84,000 men and 13,000 men—can be considered major military powers, their role in maintaining the Asian defense perimeter is not insignificant and renders the burden of the United States that much more manageable.


THE FIRE BRIGADE. It now appears that upon the conclusion of the war in Vietnam, the United States will remove most of its troops from the mainland of Asia, leaving behind only those communications, supply and intelligence officers and Special Forces personnel necessary for the reliable performance of native armies. (Defense Secretary Laird recently stated that we would maintain several thousand men for advisory and training duty in Vietnam *after* the fighting had ceased.) In previous epochs, this move would have denied a colonial power the ability to intervene quickly when native insurrections threatened the *status quo*. Thanks to the foresight of Robert McNamara, however, the Pentagon now has the capacity to intervene in any future emergency by air-lifting its counterinsurgency “fire brigade” from bases in the United States to back-country airfields in Asia. The fire brigade concept, made possible by new advances in aircraft technology, permits the United States to give up the overseas bases usually associated with a large empire, while nevertheless retaining the option of employing its troops whenever it deems intrusion necessary.

In a 1965 message to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Defense Secretary McNamara outlined America's strategic alternatives: “Either we can station large numbers of men and quantities of equipment and supplies overseas near all potential trouble spots, or we can maintain a much smaller

force in a central reserve in the United States and deploy it rapidly where needed.” Of these two approaches, McNamara argued, “a mobile ‘fire brigade’ reserve, centrally located . . . and ready for quick deployment to any threatened area in the world, is, basically, a more economical and flexible use of our military forces.” Selecting a unit to serve as such a mobile reserve was easy enough (the 82nd Airborne Division was given the job), but McNamara soon discovered that our existing air-lift capability—consisting mainly of propeller-driven C-124 Globemasters and jet-powered C-141 Starlifters—did not have the range, speed or capacity to provide a satisfactory alternative to locally based troops. His solution was to develop the CX-HLS Heavy Logistics Transport—now famous as the C-5A transport aircraft.

The C-5A was the subject of considerable Congressional debate in 1969 because of excessive cost “overruns” (the final procurement program, involving 120 aircraft, would have cost an estimated \$6 billion, or \$2.6 billion more than originally calculated). In order to overcome mounting Congressional criticism of defense contracting procedures, the Pentagon finally decided in November to limit its purchase to the eighty-one aircraft previously authorized by Congress. Even the curtailed C-5A program will, however, provide the United States with a vastly expanded air-lift capacity. Each super-jet can carry 600 troops and their equipment, or an equivalent combination of troops, vehicles and artillery. The initial group of fifty-eight C-5As will permit the Pentagon to ship an entire combat division, plus ammunition and supplies, a distance of 5,800 nautical miles (more than enough range to fly from San Francisco to Tokyo) without stopping for fuel. Once arriving in a theatre of combat, the transport's “high flotation” landing gear permits it to land on short, relatively primitive airfields.

Unfortunately, the budgetary aspects of the C-5A debate have had the effect of obscuring the long-



run strategic implications of the whole air-lift program. But if there were any doubts concerning the Pentagon's intentions, they were dispelled in mid-March 1969 when the Defense Department staged its first air-lift exercise in the Far East. Some 2,500 soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division were flown 8,500 miles from their regular quarters in Fort Bragg, N.C., to a training area 40 miles south of Seoul, South Korea. Immediately upon arrival in the test area, the paratroopers joined South Korean troops in simulated counter guerrilla maneuvers. (The whole trip was to have taken thirty-one hours, but a snow storm caused a twenty-five-hour delay in Okinawa.) According to Pentagon press statements, the exercise was designed "to test the rapid reaction capability of the United States-based strike command forces to deploy in the Pacific command ready for tactical employment." From what has been published concerning the event, the Defense Department was satisfied with the outcome of the exercise.

When the first squadrons of C-5As are stationed at bases in the United States, Robert McNamara's fire brigade concept—best described as garrisons *in absentia*—will have finally come of age.

At this point, my review of U.S. military strategy in the Pacific-Indian Ocean area would be substantially complete if it were not for the fact that southern Asia harbors some of the most rugged terrain to be found on the face of the earth. Men and equipment that can be counted on to perform respectably in temperate regions—and even elite units like the 82nd Airborne—can be defeated by harsh and unfamiliar environments. While many extreme terrain conditions can be found in South Asia, two are of particular concern to the military: the tropical rain forest and high-mountain environments. The geological, biological and climatic conditions which characterize these regions have become the subject of what the Pentagon calls research on "environmental extremes." A number of little known Army agencies participate in these studies, among them the U.S. Army Institute of Environmental Medicine, and the Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratories. Much of this research appears to be relatively innocuous; the function of the former, for instance, is to conduct "basic and applied research to determine how heat, cold, high terrestrial altitude, and work affect the soldier's life processes, his performance, and his health. The goal is to understand . . . the techniques, equipment, and procedures best calculated to make the soldier operationally effective to the optimal degree." Nevertheless, an awareness of this research enables one to anticipate some of the Pentagon's incursions into new areas. Thus if in 1962 we had known what kinds of studies were being undertaken at the Army Tropic Test Center in the Panama Canal Zone and at the Thai-U.S. Military Research and Development Center in Bangkok

(e.g., engineering studies of vehicle movement in the "swamp forest environment"), the subsequent build-up of U.S. troops in Vietnam would have been somewhat less surprising. With this experience as background, a final word must be said about the Army's program of research on "high terrestrial altitude."

Between July 29 and August 26, 1966, some 200 soldiers of the 3rd Special Forces Group participated in an unprecedented troop exercise in the vicinity of Mt. Evans, Colo. According to Army spokesmen, these Green Berets staged "the first field maneuver conducted by the U.S. Army above the critical 10,000-foot terrestrial elevation level." Mt. Evans was chosen for the exercise because it "provided the desired terrain at 11,500 to 13,500 feet, the minimal elevation considered essential to evaluate effects of 'thin atmosphere' on performance and health." These maneuvers, identified as a part of the "High Terrestrial Altitude Research Program," were sponsored by the U.S. Army Institute of Environmental Medicine and the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency. The program was designed, according to Army statements, "to insure a functional U.S. soldier properly adjusted, trained, equipped and supported to engage in combat at high elevations." A year later, the Army established "the world's highest research station" at the 17,600-foot level of Mt. Logan in the Yukon Territory of Canada. The Mt. Logan project was sponsored by the Cold Regions Laboratories and other Army agencies, and conducted by the Arctic Institute of North America. Like the Mt. Evans exercise, this project was designed to increase "U.S. Army knowledge of physiological factors associated with operations in a high-mountain environment."

Why is the Army so concerned with "physiological factors" occurring above the "critical 10,000-foot-level"? The answer can be found in a close reading of Army research reports. In a paper on "The Military Significance of Mountain Environment Studies," appearing in the May 1967 issue of *Army Research and Development*, a Pentagon scientist explains that mountainous terrain "occupies the whole southern frontier of Communist power from Central Europe to Vietnam." Since "mountains in many strategic areas will be barred to us for study purposes . . . it will often be necessary to find an accessible mountain range in which the environment seems quite similar, and study the nature of such [physiological] stresses there." With this advice in mind, one notes that the Mt. Logan project was intended to investigate "factors generally associated with activities in similar high altitudes in other parts of the world, such as the Himalayan Mountains in India." [Emphasis added.] The Himalayan Mountains constitute the western flank of the Asian defense perimeter, now being vacated by Great Britain.

The army says of the Mt. Evans maneuvers that

"in view of the likelihood that the enemy may be fully acclimatized" to high elevations, the United States must be able to overcome the environmental effects of such regions on troop performance. Since the only "enemy" likely to be acclimatized to 10,000-

foot-plus elevations are the inhabitants of the Himalayan region, it is becoming ominously clear that the U.S. counterinsurgency intervention in South Asia may some day stretch from the beaches of Danang to the furthest reaches of Nepal and Tibet. □

WAR RESEARCH AT STANFORD

SIDESTEPPIING THE MILITANTS

LARRY SCHWARTZ

Mr. Schwartz was completing his graduate studies in journalism at Stanford last year, when the demonstrations he discusses occurred.

Early in 1970, the trustees of Stanford University announced terms of an agreement to relinquish legal ownership and control of the Stanford Research Institute—a facility established in 1946 to "aid and supplement scientific research at Stanford." This divestiture appears to be a reaction to campus demonstrations last May in which students and faculty protested research which they claimed was directly related to U.S. military activities in Southeast Asia.

The final decision of the trustees—which provides for SRI, in effect, to buy itself from Stanford—is in line with a recommendation made last May by a study committee authorized by the Stanford president. But it does not meet the principal demand of the student-faculty protesters, which was that the university community exercise greater control over the institute's research. It does not end SRI's connection with war research; it merely removes the Stanford name (but not its influence) from SRI. And the institute continues to conduct the types of research against which the demonstrations were directed.

During the campus demonstrations, students turned up voluminous data which they said showed links between SRI research goals, the university's on-campus military research, and university trustees who were officers of companies that produce military materials and were in some cases also on the SRI board of directors. The decision of the trustees is an example of how a university reacts to well-documented charges coupled with student militancy.

The student demonstrations against SRI and war-related research began in April after the Stanford trustees flatly refused to consider five demands put forth by a coalition of "concerned students and faculty." The demands of this coalition—later to become the April 3 Movement (A3M)—were:

(1) End chemical and biological warfare research at SRI.

(2) Bring SRI under closer control of the university community and establish guidelines for socially acceptable research.

(3) End foreign and domestic counterinsurgency research at SRI and Stanford.

(4) End classified research at SRI and Stanford.

(5) End research in support of wars in Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia.

The A3M charged that the Stanford research complex was a political tool of the government, responding mainly to the desires of the Defense Department, and that both the university and the research institute were run by men who had a vested interest in heavy spending for military research. The ultimate goal of the A3M was to convince this same group of "educator-industrialists" that SRI ought to be a peace-oriented research center; that would, of course, imply the complete disentanglement of SRI from U.S. military efforts in Southeast Asia.

The demands of the A3M were supported by information uncovered through investigations into the research priorities of the university and the institute begun by Students for a Democratic Society as early as 1966. The students found that over the years SRI had come to depend heavily on Department of Defense funds. According to Stanford's own SRI study committee, approximately 50 per cent of the institute's \$64.2 million income (in 1968) was from the Defense Department.

The students also found that SRI held two contracts, totaling \$404,000, that were directly related to chemical and biological warfare research. And "at the same time," according to A3M literature, "in 1968 SRI did \$6,246,000 (10 per cent of its funding) in counterinsurgency work for the Pentagon on Southeast Asia."

The students named thirty-seven SRI contracts, beginning in 1966, that fell within the category of counterinsurgency research. (The A3M uses a dictionary of military terms to define counterinsurgency as "those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat a subversive insurgency.") Three of the nine 1968 counterinsurgency projects were "Human Factors in Thai Counterinsurgency Communications"; "The Evolution of Successful Counterinsurgency Operations in Malaya"; "Insurgency in Northeastern Thailand and Smuggling and Illegal Entry Across the Mekong River Borders."

The A3M leaflet listing the thirty-seven projects ends: "In any event, counterinsurgency research clearly has been and is being done at SRI and protests that counterinsurgency work cannot be eliminated because it cannot be precisely defined serve only to allow the continuation of the SRI research that has aided American military, political, and economic control of Southeast Asia."

The students claimed that the following summary of SRI policy statements shows that the direction of research was part of a political strategy:

(1) Jesse Hobson, SRI's first president, stated in 1951 that, "This nation occupies 6 per cent of the land area of the world, has 7 per cent of the world's population, but it now possesses 67 per cent of the world's wealth. . . . Research must be the heart, the foundation, the life blood of our present defense economy if we are to maintain this position."

(2) Ed Robinson, vice president of SRI International, told a gathering of Stanford alumni in 1957, that "the free world must not lose Southeast Asia . . . as it had already lost China."

(3) A 1969 SRI International report states, "SRI is dedicated to the strengthening of private business on an international scale and our objective is to do everything within our power to develop this private sector as the basic factor in economic strength and progress."

The students concluded that by supporting this strategy the Stanford trustees were working for their own "selfish" interests. Trustee Ernest Arbuckle is chairman of the board of directors of SRI and dean of the Stanford Business School. He and trustee Edmund Littlefield also serve as directors of both Wells Fargo, the nation's eleventh largest bank, and Utah Mining and Construction, a firm that builds military air bases in Vietnam and owns mining operations in Latin America. Trustee Charles Ducommun is a director of Lockheed. Trustee William Hewlett owns and directs Hewlett-Packard, a leading manufacturer of electronic measuring devices that have direct war and defense applications. (Former trustee Packard, the other half of Hewlett-Packard, is now Assistant Secretary of Defense.) Mr. Hewlett also directs FMC Corporation, a manufacturer of armed personnel carriers and a wide variety of munitions. Trustee Roger Lewis is president and board chairman of General Dynamics. Trustee Tom Jones represents Northrup Aviation, a manufacturer of fighter aircraft and CS tear gas—used in Vietnam by the U.S. Army and in this country by the police. Trustee Dean Watkins, former professor of electrical engineering at Stanford, is an owner-director of Watkins-Johnson, a company manufacturing electronic components for the Pentagon. Other trustees have oil holdings, are corporate lawyers, or hold appointed governmental, judicial or Cabinet positions.

Several trustees are also involved with the university through the Stanford Industrial Park—university-owned land leased to private businesses for the construction of manufacturing, laboratory and re-

search facilities. Among corporations with industrial operations in the Park are Watkins-Johnson, Lockheed and Hewlett-Packard.

According to Stanford's SDS chapter, "These are the men who run Stanford. They are not educators. Understanding the bases of power from which they qualified for positions on the Stanford board is a first step toward understanding the priorities they bring to Stanford."

On campus, the students discovered classified contracts that have direct and practical military applications and that are, in fact, used in Vietnam to counter North Vietnamese insurgency. The Electronics Laboratories on the Stanford campus actually held \$2.2 million in classified contracts, but the brunt of the A3M's on-campus attack centered on the Systems Technique Lab located in the Applied Electronics Laboratory. According to the pamphlet "The Goods on AEL," published during the eight-day occupation of that lab by the A3M, ". . . STL is an on-campus research program whose objective is to offer a close and immediate coupling between the results of academic research programs and the most advanced needs of military electronics in such areas as counter measures." The Systems Technique Lab concentrated on electronics research—jamming, deceiving, evading, or destroying hostile radar.

The A3M charged that work done in this lab in the late fifties "contributed directly to the present generation of highly sophisticated electronic equipment now being used on the ground and in the air over Vietnam." William Rambo, director of the Electrical Engineering Department's research program and head of AEL stated that "if the electronic warfare research program hadn't had some military impact over the past sixteen years it would not have been re-funded." The A3M claimed that "STL holds six classified contracts worth over \$1 million." Former trustee David Packard contributed funds to construct this particular lab.

The students' charges were well-researched and cogently presented. What did they accomplish? Today the score card shows that the militant students and faculty achieved one and one-half of their five demands. As part of the break with the university, the board of directors of SRI announced the end of all further research in chemical and biological warfare. The faculty of Stanford University voted to phase out classified research projects on campus. But the trustees of Stanford University have evaded the main thrust of the demands by cutting the legal ties with SRI, selling it (for \$25 million) to the board of directors of the institute. In so doing they have removed the university from any direct relationship with the research programs and strategies of the institute. But SRI's research goals, priorities and directions remain unchanged. The research to which the students objected continues to be done. SRI is still involved more in "defense" work than in research devoted to solving man's pressing social problems. □

THE ECONOMICS OF ROCK

PAUL M. HIRSCH

Mr. Hirsch has made a study of the popular music industry as part of his graduate work in sociology at the University of Michigan.

Rock and roll radio emerged in the fifties as part of the radio industry's confused response to the onslaught of television. As soon as television began cutting into network radio's "lowest common denominator" audience, it became clear that the older medium could not compete as an equal. Radio was forced to find, or create, new audience markets. American youth was thus given a medium "all its own" as the accidental by-product of a revolution in communications technology and its economic consequences.

Stunned parents and veteran radio men considered screaming Top 40 radio a vulgar intrusion into their personal and professional lives. Not fully comprehending that old-time radio was very dead, they expected that the broadcasting of this raucous music was a passing fad, but radio's early, reluctant experiment with the Top 40 rock format was only the beginning. It initiated a much broader trend toward specialty programming of all types—each directed at a limited audience. This new subcultural programming slices the total audience into homogeneous marketable parts. Thus *all-news*, *all-country*, *all-Top 40*, *all-soul*, and *all-"underground"* stations are each broadcasting the same news, or views, or music, repetitively, twenty-four hours a day.

Almost every cultural group in major metropolitan areas has its very own radio station. The older "something for everyone" formula has been replaced by what W. H. Honan calls "broadcast parochialism." Paradoxically, this encourages cultural pluralism and cultural isolation simultaneously. If the generation gap in musical taste is wider today than ever before, it is due in large part to the near total segregation of one age group's media listening patterns from the other's. Studies have shown that most people isolate themselves from alternative viewpoints and cultures as a matter of course. While cultural pluralism is enhanced at the aggregate level by special formats, it is more likely to be retarded at the individual level.

The rock music explosion, however, can be attributed only in part to the impact of television on the radio industry. While the air play of rock and roll records has stimulated the present situation, it is hardly in itself the sufficient cause. It has provided young people an unprecedented opportunity to learn of new and unusual records, but it did not create their eagerness to seize the opportunity once it was made available to them.

The "youth market" was there long before radio

stations began catering to specialty audiences. It was smaller a generation or two ago, and relatively poorer, but young people lined up for hours in advance to hear Benny Goodman and Frank Sinatra, to mob them on stage, and to be with other young people in an *ad hoc* counter culture. They, too, purchased tremendous quantities of their idols' records, ignoring their elders' distaste for such "uncouth" music.


Three notable changes characterize today's youth from those of earlier periods. First, there are now about 10 million more Americans between the ages of 15 and 26 than there were twenty years ago. In the 1960s, the postwar baby boom yielded a 43 per cent increase in the 18-to-25 age group. Second, they are wealthier than any previous generation of American youth. Expenditures of teen-agers alone have more than doubled since 1959, from \$10 billion to more than \$20 billion. And third, they take for granted much of the technology which still impresses their parents and teachers. Each of these changes has tremendously affected the record industry, its consumers and young professional musicians.

Until the middle fifties, 75 per cent of all domestic hit records were produced and distributed by four record companies. Among them, they controlled the recorded output of America. Their access to the public, however, was through network radio, directed at the lowest common denominator, and not surprisingly the big four tended to gear their products to what the networks selected for that radio audience. They produced few rhythm-and-blues records, little progressive jazz or rock and roll. "Specialty" labels like Atlantic, King and Blue Note won these subcultural markets by default. For network radio to have played some of Billie Holiday's best records available (on specialty labels), or to have interviewed Cisco Houston coast to coast, would have been commercially equivalent to having Lenny Bruce on *The Ed Sullivan Show*. Under these circumstances, subcultural markets remained underdeveloped, with information passed largely by word of mouth. The media presented the dominant culture.

America's youth became numerous and prosperous at just about the time when radio was forced into those subcultural markets. Top 40 programming took the four major record companies by surprise. Long used to producing for the mainstream, they were unable and, at first, unwilling to plunge into subcultural marketing. The vacuum was filled by numerous small entrepreneurs, eager to enter the hit-record sweepstakes. A 45 rpm single costs only several hundred dollars to record and manufacture, and the prospect of huge returns on such small investment was irresistible.

Once the sales of rock records began to cut into

the previously stable markets of the big four, remedial action was begun. The big companies simply bought up the enterprising little ones (which is how, for example, Elvis Presley became associated with RCA records). But the major labels were clearly on the run, and mainly reacting. The steady increase in the recording freedom allowed musicians in their dealings with record companies can be traced back to pressures upon the big four to maintain sales lead-



ership and to strengthen their competitive position in the rock and roll field. Singers and musicians were for the first time allowed a major say as to which songs should be recorded.

Many analysts attribute the sometimes daring and radical lyrics of rock and roll songs to the desire of record companies to please (or to convert) their consumers. They argue that today's controversial lyrics reflect a radical shift in the attitudes of young people (or record company magnates). More attention should be given to the companies' loss of control over the musicians, and to the gradual intrusion of the musicians' own values into the songs they record. These values are by no means clearly perceived or shared by the mass of young record buyers. A recent study of high school students by John Robinson and Paul Hirsch (*Psychology Today*, October 1969) suggests that the wider the audience there is for a song, the less likely it is to be understood by its admirers.

In spite of its apparent turmoil, including the payola scandals of 1958, the record industry experienced no major crises after the advent of rock. Volume sales have increased for most major firms at such a phenomenal rate that it has been possible for a company's profits to rise at the same time that its share of the market decreased. Gross sales have climbed from \$99 million in 1945 to more than \$1 billion in 1968.

Subcultural radio programming has spurred sales by providing needed exposure for more and more records to more and more kids with more and more money. "Underground" radio stations are the latest example of this trend. The now conservative Top 40

station does not distinguish among styles *within* rock and roll (of which there are many, as "rock" has now absorbed elements of all other types of music); its appeal is directed primarily to all sectors of the teen-age population. The newer FM "underground" stations are heavily weighted with rock styles which appeal most strongly to older, more well-to-do students, and to recent college graduates. This group, increasingly dissatisfied with "bubble gum rock," provides the main audience for the controversial songs that are being written today. The material which knocked the Smothers Brothers off network television would sound tame enough on most underground stations.

Many of the early "specialty" firms have prospered. The Atlantic, King and Blue Note labels, for example, have been added to the growing roster of record companies now functioning as independent subdivisions of large conglomerates. Although recording costs have risen in the last few years, the initial investment is still quite low. Record companies "lend" musicians the money to cover studio costs when the records are cut, and deduct it "off the top" if the record is successful. Increasingly massive promotion funds are required to convert records by new groups into hits, but the prospect of huge returns on this investment is a steady lure. By 1967, it is reliably estimated, more than 300 record companies were each releasing an average of one 45 rpm single per week. The competition for radio time among the estimated annual total of more than 15,000 singles is convulsive. Many say the race track offers a better deal.

Finally, the contribution of modern technology is important. All phases of rock music have become increasingly tied to technology, from concert staging and recording techniques to record retailing and audience management. Musicians and their audiences regard better amplifiers, microphones, tape recorders, film techniques, record packaging, outdoor festivals and speaker systems as a natural and desirable part of their environment. They assume, with accustomed indifference, that the gadgets they've grown up with are to be used when needed, and simply ignored when irrelevant. Most young people, including "dropouts" and "dissenters," are neither alienated, as some have argued, by such signs of the age as television, moon shots and atomic weapons, nor are they particularly impressed. They seem only "natural" to a generation which has always known them. While this attitude is now starting to be challenged by a growing concern for our environment, it is still too early to pronounce today's vanguard youth seriously hostile to modern gadgetry. Persuasive evidence that we are still far from a wholesale "back to nature" movement is the overwhelming popularity of rock and roll, and all the technology it encompasses. □

BOOKS & THE ARTS

A Question of Value

THE POLITICAL SCIENCES. By Hugh Stretton. Basic Books. 464 pp. \$10.

BRUCE MAZLISH

Mr. Mazlish teaches history at M.I.T. He is the author of *The Riddle of History: The Great Speculators from Vico to Freud* (Harper & Row) and the editor of *The Railroad and the Space Program: An Exploration in Historical Analogy* (M.I.T. Press).

"Commitment to Values," "End of Ideology": the intellectual atmosphere of our times is pierced by loud, and often shrill, battle cries. In the 18th century, in what seems a more serene and confident time, many if not most advanced thinkers believed implicitly that man's mind would be able to comprehend completely a lawlike and fixed universe. Hegel gave a special turn—the dialectical spiral—to this notion, but his philosophy, too, lent support to an ultimate fusion of human mind and reason. Marx, as we all know, stood Hegel on his head, with various pieces of change jangling out of his pockets as a result. One part of Hegel's mental currency was borrowed by Marx: he, too, seems to have believed that the "laws" of social evolution could be fully known. Another part, however, was put in jeopardy, and regarded as counterfeit: Marx, far more than Hegel, rooted man's thought in his material conditions, and hence his nonuniversal "interests." Elaborating this conviction, Marx developed further the notion of ideology and shadowed forth the field of sociology of knowledge. Henceforward, all knowledge seemed particular knowledge.

The wish for objective, certain and universal knowledge, nevertheless, persisted. The natural sciences seemed to offer a model. Thus efforts at a presumed "value-free" social science proceeded apace; its enemies call it "scientism." More recently, some social scientists have hailed the "end of ideology"; clearly, their belief is more fantasy than reality. In the contemporary scene, the attack on putative value-free social science is carried on mainly by radicals. Discovering sociology of knowledge anew, many of them press into battle with the fervor of those who have just experienced a revelation.

The extreme of their position may be said to be "action before ideology." A typical hero is Che Guevara, who announced that "revolutionary theory, as

the expression of a social truth, surpasses any declaration of it." More typical, at least of American radicals, are those who wish for antecedent theory and ideology, but infused with openly announced values. At this point, action joins ideology as a co-partner, not a prior event. Needless to say, however, the values are activist values.

Such activist values, of course, are meant to bring theory directly into touch with the masses on whom theory ultimately impinges; thus we hear much talk about participatory democracy from those who also attack value-free social science. Paradoxically, the notion of "politicization of the masses" is a current favorite of "establishment" social scientists, who see it as a necessary part of "modernization." While participatory democracy and politicization of the masses obviously are not necessarily the same, they do share many elements (although both sides to this debate may well be horrified by this assertion).

The radicals' desire to "politicize" the masses, however, does not stop there. It extends to a desire also to "politicize" the social sciences. On this point the radicals are sharply divided with the proponents of value-free social science. It is into this situation that Hugh Stretton's book, *The Political Sciences*, felicitously introduces itself. It is about time that we had real sense and insight made part of the fervid and heated discussion. While I disagree with some of Mr. Stretton's positions, as I shall argue later, his book represents in the main a positive and major entry in the debate.

Stretton's thesis is straightforward. All explanation, of any sort, is selective. In social sciences and history, which is Stretton's primary concern, the principles by which we select come immediately from our values (especially our political values). These give purpose to our inquiries and, in an important sense, shape the results that we shall obtain. Almost by definition, then, there cannot be anything called value-free inquiry. Those who pretend otherwise are "scientistic." What they do is simply hide their values—almost always, the maintenance of the *status quo*—under jargon concocted in sterile imitation of the natural sciences. They advance neither the social sciences nor society.

Mr. Stretton does not leave the matter in these simple terms. He pursues it relentlessly in the exhaustive illustration

of his theses in area after area and in the direction of one very important theoretical extension: the assertion that human social behavior frequently does not exhibit fundamental regularities for the precise reason that human beings *willfully choose to change their behavior*, that is, bring their values to bear on events and trends. In so doing, they exhibit the phenomenon of the self-fulfilling prophecy—the "regularity" becomes what we intend and predict it to be. Thus the aim of social science ought properly to be, not the uncovering of immutable laws but the enlarging of "the number and potentiality of self-fulfilling and self-averting programs."

In his attack on scientism and its pretensions to value-free inquiry, Stretton ranges wide and far for his materials. Displaying an impressive interdisciplinary command, he marshals the literature of history, sociology, law, philosophy and economics for his purposes. The first part of his book centers on the question of historical explanation: Stretton starts from the fact that "In December 1899, Joseph Chamberlain, the best-known protagonist of social reform then in the British cabinet, apparently changed his mind about old age pensions. . . . Why?" Making up model explanations as he goes, Stretton expands this question into the larger question of "what caused imperialism," adding actual efforts at explanation of both questions by, among others, Halévy, Garvin, Julian Amery, Von Bülow, T. Roosevelt, Frederick Jackson Turner, J. A. Hobson, Lenin, Schumpeter, Viner, D. K. Fieldhouse and William Langer. The reader interested in imperialism, as well as the notion of historical knowledge, will emerge exhausted but undoubtedly enlightened about dispositional explanations, the method of *Verstehen*, the concept of covering laws, and so forth.

Part 2, "Truth," is for me the real heart of the book. It is here that Stretton argues most originally his conceptions about the "general principles of selection in social science and history" (the Darwinian overtones in this phrase are probably accidental). I have already suggested the general lines along which he debates. Part 3, "Truth in Use," is another exhaustive application of the "general principles," but this time primarily in sociology and political economy: Halévy (again), E. H. Carr, Lewis Coser, J. M. Keynes, Paul Samuelson, Arthur Lewis,

David Riesman, Oscar Lewis and Gunnar Myrdal are the witnesses this time. Talcott Parsons, Ralf Dahrendorf and David Easton emerge as the prime villains of the piece. (Easton—perhaps the *bête noire* of Stretton's charge—has apparently recanted. In his presidential address to the American Political Science Association, September 1969, published as "The New Revolution in Political Science," *American Political Science Review*, December 1969, Easton, a leader of the behavioral revolution, accepts the "post-behavioral revolution" in political science, and even urges his colleagues to form an activist-type Federation of Social Scientists!)

Stretton modestly admits most of his work to be derivative. "Readers who know them," he tells us, "will see how indebted I am to theoretical works by Paul Streeten, Peter Winch, William Dray, Gunnar Myrdal, C. Wright Mills and E. H. Carr. Most of any theoretical originality is theirs. . . ." Stretton's power is in the synthetic exposition of their abstract ideas and the exemplification of these ideas in the actual materials of history and social science.

With all the virtues, both of insight and detail, of Stretton's work, it is distressing to find him introducing a dubious political note to his work. "It suits the shamelessly political purposes of *this* argument," he tells us, "to classify political attitudes and values as Conservative, Radical or Liberal—three categories which will presently be reduced to two." A liberal is defined as "one who wants to leave society alone"; radicals as those who "want to interfere with society in order to improve it, perhaps inventively, perhaps in imitation of more just or more advanced societies"; and conservatives as "interventionists," like the radicals, but for purposes of maintaining the social structure.

Marx tried to establish a polarized class system in the same way, by eliminating the myriad positions in between, and leaving only capitalists and proletariats in the arena of history. Stretton reduces things to interventionists and noninterventionists (the latter all liberals). But this, surely, is to mangle the variegated reality of political positions today, and to set up straw men (who will have, of course, a self-fulfilling prophecy aspect). It will not do for Stretton to claim that his definition of liberals is his to make, and that he has taken the stock figure of 18th-century *laissez-faire* man. His readers will interpret him otherwise. "Liberals," today, as we all know, are interventionists. In America, they wish the federal government to intervene massively in state and local affairs. One may not like the form or content or, especially, the extent of their interventionism, but to label them nonin-

terventionists is a perverse use of words.

Indeed, in this Alice in Wonderland political scene, one might more properly label many radicals as noninterventionists: they wish the federal government or the state government (or sometimes *any* government) to *stay out* of local affairs, and to let people run their own affairs. Of course this is interventionist in another sense, for it may be said to "interfere with society in order to improve it"; but this merely points up the vacuity of interventionist-noninterventionist definitions. All politics in today's fast-changing world is interventionist. The problem is to define, and understand, the nature of the intervention advocated.

Similarly, it seems to me that Stretton, while absolutely correct about the theoretical insufficiencies of social scientism, underestimates its potentialities for social action of which he might approve. Today, it is clear, the scientism of behavioral science appears on the side of the establishment. In other days, this was not so. Were not the Utilitarians scientistic? One need only remember Bentham's "felicific calculus." Yet, did not these "Philosophical Radicals," as they were called, spearhead the drive to reform and "improve" British law and legislation, both nationally and municipally (for example, Chadwick's reforms)? And surely the greatest scientistic social theorist of them all—Karl Marx—has had a truly radicalizing effect on society! (Stretton's most illustrious recent predecessor in the attack

on scientism has been F. A. Hayek, in his *The Counter-Revolution of Science*—and Mr. Hayek is a notorious "conservative.") In short, scientism is bad, not because it is momentarily noninterventionist but because it is—scientistic.

Alas, it will not disappear completely. It is built into the most fundamental metaphors by which the human mind "knows" its world. The construct of revolution, political or industrial, draws upon a concept of astronomical science; the notions of growth and development emerge from the Greek ideas of *physis*, a biological concept (see the splendid treatment of this controlling metaphor of Western social science in Robert Nisbet's *Social Change and History*); and so on. What Stretton does, and brilliantly so when he is not being too blatantly political, is to warn us of the dangers of unconscious and uncircumscribed scientism.

So, too, he alerts us to the false claims of value-free inquiry. But here, as well, caution is necessary. Obviously, the natural scientist who wants to fly to the moon, or to cure cancer, is inspired to his research by a value. He must not, however, merely see what he wishes to see, for example, a cure where it doesn't exist, and in this sense he must be *value-neutral*. This position is not to be confused with the valued use society makes of his finding. We may not *want* to fly to the moon; we may want to cure cancer. Science and technology seem to

SPAWNING IN NORTHERN MINNESOTA

Under cracking pieces of the moon, eelpout
slap their milky bellies home. Water
breaking north turns granite at the mouth.
But here they batter, twist, and squirm over
and over each other, whipping dorsal fins
in a spinning roll, knocking flanks in the wake
of rocks—the splintered river dizzy with oxygen.

Birch explodes at thirty below, and spit
will scrape and clatter on the bank. Liquid fish
don't play games on a shallow bar.
In the bed and mix of the riffle, gills rake
water for air. Females plant gravel
with clouds. Flocks of males boil in a kiss
and make a hundred million chances work.

Cousin to codfish, an eelpout's liver
can't shrink goiters, but crossing moose
are sometimes whales, and any random otter
is a shark. Spawn floats the tinkling moon
downhill to a glacier's melted thumb
where limestone fossils crawl. Granite is ice.
The Mesabi is young, my county an ocean.

David McElroy

have an imperative of their own, which is self-impelled; but we all know that this is because we have so far *willed* it that way.

When we come to the social sciences, the problem is complicated in the manifold ways that Stretton's book so extensively examines. Most good social scientists that I know of do not try to be value-free, but as value-neutral as possible. That is, even if they value a society without ethnic or racial conflict, they try not to let that value obscure the effort to understand the actual functioning of ethnic conflict, say, in Belgium, or the Congo. That they often fall short of their aim, through insufficient awareness of their unconscious bias or socially rooted commitments, is not a reason to discard value-neutrality as an ideal. Nor is it ground for proudly proclaiming, as is now becoming fashionable especially among the young, an end to neutral research. An end to the *pretense* of neutrality, yes; but an open invitation to abandon the deepest possible effort at inquiry that is value-inspired in origin but value-neutral in procedure and observation is a call to move into the bogs of wishful thinking or, worse, into the

swamps of propaganda masquerading as social science (exactly the complaint against many of the pretenders to value-free inquiry).

Stretton is wise about all these matters, though, as I have suggested, the political man in him sometimes outvotes the philosopher. He reminds us constantly of the instrumental nature of all thought. As Nietzsche perceived so acutely, "every great philosophy, up to now, has been the personal confession of its originator. . . . It always creates the world in its own image: it cannot do otherwise, for philosophy is this tyrannical desire; it is the most spiritual will to power, to 'creation of the world,' to the *causa prima*." Stretton shrewdly calls our attention to the fact that social science is also the confession of the social scientist. Like the philosopher, the social scientist, too, aims at "creation of the world," not its mere description. If he is honest, he admits this, and then goes on to offer us "futuribles," an enlargement of "the number and potentiality of self-fulfilling or self-averting programs." The merit of Stretton's book is that it suggests to the social scientist both why and how he should fulfill this task. □

finer the historian as a man concerned "to discover, as accurately as the most sophisticated use of evidence will allow, things as they actually were . . . why they were so, and why they changed." Thus the historian is a protagonist, "dangerous and subversive," who has largely destroyed The Past created by official and other chroniclers. There is much truth in this analysis; though Plumb seems overly optimistic, if not simply mistaken, in asserting that various myths and visions of the American past are well down the road to their grave.

Even more to the point, Plumb recognizes that killing The Past (like killing our fathers) does not solve all our problems. For The Past, even though distorted and distorting, did provide a sense of community and purpose. The Past helped people move themselves, including improving their lot, as well as helping the rulers control the people. And Plumb realizes that, having killed The Past, the historian may enshrine "analytic understanding" in its place. He correctly warns that that can lead to "a paralysis in social matters": meaning, if I read him correctly, that comprehension does not, in and of itself, lead on to anything; and can, indeed, produce a particularly deadly kind of resignation in the face of complexity.

But killing The Past, as with killing our fathers, also contains another danger. The act has an inherent propensity to generate an illusion of complete freedom. Thus the historian can emerge (as some seem to be doing) with the feeling that history is merely the story that anyone tells in order to free himself or herself from the old and evil chroniclers. That proposition leads on to the conclusion that we are *sui generis*, an attitude at least as harmful as the feeling that nothing can be done, or the view that history produces laws (or answers) which we must follow.

Plumb's answer to such problems calls for the historian to go beyond uncovering and explaining the nature of social change, and to make "positive statements about human life," formulate "principles about social living," and "create hope." The way to do that, in his view, is to "teach . . . proclaim . . . demonstrate" the "one truth of history—that the condition of mankind has improved, materially alas more than morally, but nevertheless both have improved." Such actions by the historian will "give humanity some confidence" as it faces "a task that will still be cruel and long—the resolution of the tensions and antipathies that exist within the human species." But to follow that advice is to start down a path that will change the historian into a kind of superheated lay minister. At best, and by Plumb's own formulation, the historian becomes an advocate who offers one general answer

The Crown on Clio's Head

THE DEATH OF THE PAST. By J. H. Plumb. Houghton Mifflin Co. 153 pp. \$5.

WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS

Mr. Williams' latest book is *The Roots of Modern American Empire*, recently published by Random House.

Plumb's essay is not so much "an intellectual adventure," as one distinguished reader has reported, as an informed and sophisticated recapitulation of an argument first advanced before World War I. To wit: defuse history (which Plumb calls The Past) by removing the ideology of the historian and thereby transform what has been an instrument of social control into a tool of human improvement. The questions raised by that proposition have always been whether the effort, if possible, would not in truth create an even more perfect instrument of social control; or, if not possible, would merely produce a more effective intelligence preaching a subtle version of the gospel of progress.

Plumb says No to both questions. His argument is nicely stated in his introductory section: "There has been a growing determination for historians to try and understand what happened, purely in its own terms and not in the service of religion or national destiny, or morali-

ty, or the sanctity of institutions. . . . The historian's growing purpose has been to see things as they really were, and from this study to attempt to formulate processes of social change which are acceptable on historical grounds and none other."

Defining the concept of The Past—to be distinguished from true history—as "those simple, structural generalizations by which our forefathers interpreted the purpose of life in historical terms," Plumb then asserts that industrial society "does not need the past" because "its intellectual and emotional orientation is towards change rather than conservation, towards exploitation and consumption." Instead of The Past—"always a created ideology with a purpose, designed to control individuals, or motivate societies, or inspire classes"—"we need an historical past, objective and true," that "can describe what has happened and what, therefore, it may be imprudent to do."

Though Plumb does not use the term, it is useful to view The Past (in his sense) as the work of the chronicler who spins out a particular and partial reconstruction of what has gone before in order to point a moral. That helps to avoid confusion about his meaning of the terms history and historian. Plumb de-

to the questions he has raised. Plumb is trying to keep the crown on Clio's head even as he tells us that the old regime has collapsed.

I think it wiser to forget Clio. The age of monarchy in the realm of learning is gone forever. Let historians be content to function as historians in the root sense: men and women who struggle to live creatively in both worlds of their schizophrenic universe. That demanding task requires them to wrench themselves out of their own past (and present) in order—as Plumb says—to “see things as they really were, and from this study to attempt to formulate the processes of social change.” To be sure, no one can wholly transcend himself in that fashion. The point, however, is to make the effort with all of one's capacity and skills. For if one abandons that objective he is better (as well as more honestly) occupied as a novelist or playwright, or as a tough-punching advocate of whatever cause engages him at the moment.

There are two rewards in making a serious effort to satisfy the schizophrenic discipline of the citizen as historian. First, it enables one to come closer to

seeing things as they really were: because, on the one hand, to get into another man's skin one has to get out of one's own; and, on the other hand, one has to get out of both lives in order to produce the best analysis of what happened. Second, it enables the citizen as historian to consider his work as a fountain of questions rather than as a bag of answers.

The best historians have been perceptive in defining and raising the more central questions faced by human beings throughout their existence. But history in this root sense does not offer any answers. Men and women of the present must provide the answers. Hence the historian must return to his own society as a citizen and, with no quarter asked or given, engage other citizens in a dialogue to determine the best answers to those questions. In that process, the historian should be honored and listened to, not for raising the questions but for the quality of his answers as a citizen. And, for that matter, the most meaningful way to preach a hope for mankind, and a belief in improvement, is to commit oneself as a citizen to that dialogue and effort. □

The book is replete with assertions about “Americans.” The ahistoricism of the author's imprecise generalizations reflects a moralizing intent. Sketching the rise of standardized statistical accounting as a technique in social and political administration, he declares that Americans confuse statistical norms with moral and political ones. In history we are supposed to find the record of our national character—and above all, we are supposed to pronounce it impeccable. It would be disruptive, apparently, to analyze the rise of quantitative methods of social and economic bookkeeping in terms of the interests it served. He attributes importance to the invention of the cash register, but passes over the profit motive.

The silences of this book, then, are very loud—as is something I would term its undertone of nostalgia were it not so very audible. The rise of systematic electoral and political analysis, Boorstin finds, has eliminated the “mystery” which once attached to the emergence of a national majority. He does call for new political measures to record the votes of the disintegrated majority—but no alternative political conception underlies the proposal, which must remain therefore a pious hope. Its source appears to be Boorstin's revulsion from some of the newer forms of politics: minority-group movements, direct attacks on the functioning of bureaucracies, demonstrations.

Pseudo-Gemeinschaft

THE DECLINE OF RADICALISM: Reflections on America Today. By Daniel J. Boorstin. Random House. 241 pp. \$4.95.

NORMAN BIRNBAUM

Mr. Birnbaum, one of the founding editors of the *New Left Review*, is a professor of sociology at Amherst College. He is the author of *The Crisis of Industrial Society* (Oxford University Press).

Garrulous and empty, pompous and trivial, self-congratulatory and unashamed, this book is a painful record of the decomposition of critical intelligence. An almost random assemblage of seven pieces, it is an (unintended) academic parody of Pop art. That art pretends there is significance in the reproduction of the surface aspects of our most banal perceptions—and only intensifies banality. The arguments in Professor Boorstin's book assume some arcane truths to be inherent in America's most vulgar clichés; in the end, the clichés are academized, and their vulgarity reinforced.

The author does not leave us in any doubt as to his intentions. In the foreword, we are informed that “These essays have been written in years when the disruptions of American community have reached a peacetime climax. While four-

letter obscenities have lost their stigma, many well-meaning Americans treat patriotism and affirmation as indecent words. Although I have written in an enquiring mood, my keynote for this book is a single word oddly forgotten in our later-twentieth century America: Yes.”

Boorstin fuses affirmation and patriotism in his treatment of what he terms “the consumption community.” Not for him the disillusion of American capitalism's customers: Ralph Nader, apparently, is to be numbered among the disrupters. In metaphors which would make many who work on Madison Avenue cough in embarrassment, the sales effort is depicted as creating a truly democratic polity. Years ago, a distinguished sociologist analyzed the mass media as agencies which induced in the populace systematic ideological distortion to create an inauthentic community (“pseudo-Gemeinschaft” in the technical terminology). Not without a patronizing tone toward the social sciences, Boorstin denies that there is inauthenticity at all; and with sovereign contempt for three generations of social criticism in this country, praises American capitalism not for producing goods but for shaping citizens. “In a wealthy society your gain is my loss; in a standard of living society your gain is my gain.”

Revulsion, indeed, is perhaps the key to this enterprise. The book appears to have been put together to justify the publication of its final chapter: “The New Barbarians: the Decline of Radicalism.” In it, we are given a conceptual analysis of the difference between “disagreement” and “dissent.” As far as I can see, “disagreement” is positive since it occurs within limits approved of by Boorstin. “Dissent,” however, is negative—it offends the author's sense of political propriety.

To this is appended a denunciation of the New Left as seekers after immediate sensations, as destroyers of culture. We are given a three-point analysis of true radicalism, but it is difficult on the basis of these points (radicalism as the search for meaning, as having specific content, and as a search for community) to see why Boorstin should denounce the New Left. The New Left does require stringent criticism, from without as well as within, and an intelligent conservative could tell us much (some, like Robert Nisbet and Hannah Arendt, have done so). What we have here, however, is liberalism in *extremis*, liberalism reduced not to its assumptions but to a set of attitudes—defensive and rigidified.

It is easy to attribute the defects of the book to the author's insistence on making an affirmation. Curiously, the book is

not at all affirmative: it is a concatenation of randomized historical assertions and querulous philosophizing. Boorstin has some ideal of American community in his mind, and some of its elements are not devoid of nobility: equality, justice, mutual comprehension. He finds it impossible to suppose that America has not fulfilled these ideals, and turns instead on those who assess our performance by our promise. Briefly, he lacks the moral courage to declare much of our national life a failure. The rest follows—a willful systematization of our history which depicts it as benign, the attribution of our troubles not to our institutions or our inherited historical characteristics but to those who seek to transcend them.

Ancient emperors killed messengers who brought bad tidings; it is surprising to see a historian re-enact this ritual. Indeed, it is the ritualized aspect of the book which sticks in one's mind after one closes it. The entire project is a form of compulsive avoidance of doubt. In life, human beings can break through obsessions and compulsions when motivated by a positive passion. One would suppose that a liberal would value freedom and would make the strenuous effort necessary to redefine it for a new epoch. But where continuity and order are treated as supreme values, history cannot be understood and experience must be stereotyped. What we have here is a record of fear. □

Agon, Ludus and Paidia

A GAMUT OF GAMES. By Sid Sackson. Random House. 210 pp. \$6.95.

THE PROTRACTED GAME: A Wei-ch'i Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy. By Scott A. Boorman. Oxford University Press. 242 pp. \$7.50.

ROBERT F. SAYRE

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Games are an important part of contemporary American culture: witness the huge increases in both spectator and participant sports; television game shows; sociological and mathematical studies of game theory; "war games" as played on computers; innocent and not so innocent parlor games. In literature, George Plimpton plays sports with the pros, while Kurt Vonnegut plays *Cat's Cradle* with the students and Robert Coover's protagonist plays *The Universal Baseball Association* with himself. Even the best-seller, *Games People Play* is, according to Sid Sackson's book, a game now itself.

Sackson, described on the jacket of his book as "the country's leading game inventor, collector and expert on game history," has hunted for games in the Patent Office and in foreign museums and libraries; he has contributed new games to both *Esquire* and the monthly game feature of *Scientific American*. *A Gamut of Games* is a suitably light-spirited and yet precisely written and illustrated description of thirty-eight new and different games. Twenty-two were invented by Mr. Sackson, others by his correspondents around the world and his friends in the New York Game Associates (of which he is president), and five are attributed to "Anon."—forgotten old games that he thinks should be played again. None re-

quire expensive special boards or equipment. They can be played with pencil and paper or cards, poker chips, a checkerboard, etc. (The true game nut, Sackson seems to assume, prefers it this way, transforming the materials of one game into another, making do.) Sackson's games are a splendid variety of the hard and the easy, the quick and the cerebral, solitaires, replacements for tick-tack-toe, and versions of two-handed bridge and poker.

Sackson has a fascinating store of information about games. He tells us, for example, that

on January 5, 1904, Patent No. 748,626 was granted to Lizzie J. Magie for a game board. The game, known as The Landlord's Game, was based on the then current "single-tax" theory of economist Henry George. The board . . . is undoubtedly recognizable to anyone who has ever played Monopoly. . . . In the 1930s Charles Darrow, an unemployed heating engineer, added the concept of building houses on the rental property, after obtaining a monopoly of all properties of the same color. He thereby created the most popular proprietary board game of all time and ended up a millionaire.

Sackson reproduces the Patent Office diagram of The Landlord's Game—with railroads, utilities, jail, and increasingly higher priced properties, plus such squares (not in Monopoly) as "Poor House" and "Labor Upon Mother Earth Produces Wages." What Lizzie Magie had initiated, he explains later, was "one of the most important game ideas of the century, that of ownership of parts of the board by the players."

The game in the *Gamut* which I have played most is one of the author's

own which he calls Bowling Solitaire. You play it with only twenty cards (aces through tens of two suits), arranging ten of them in a triangle like ten bowling pins and then removing them by matching numbers with the remaining ten in certain ways. It can be played easily, and yet has tricky features I haven't yet mastered. Still cleverer Sackson games like Focus, for two players, with a modified checkerboard, or Patterns II, for three to six players using only pencils, papers and their inductive wits, could be studied all one's game-playing life.

Sackson's preference, clearly, is for games emphasizing what the French sociologist of games, Roger Caillois in *Man, Play, and Games* defines as games of *agon* or competition (rather than chance, mimicry or vertigo) and games of *ludus*, that is, intricate order and regulated make-believe (rather than *paidia*, or frolicsome exuberance). The object in a Sackson game is to pick up something new, think it out, and then as rapidly as possible gain control over the otherwise unfamiliar and chancy environment. Do that and you win, though you can still have fun while you lose. Games are a relief from the dominant social reality of calculation and competition, but they remain a version of it.

Sackson appends to the *Gamut* roughly 200 short reviews of the better new games on sale in stores, including twenty-one "Financial Games," twenty-eight "War and Battle Games," and thirty-one "Word Games." He also provides some interesting history of older games; for example, that cribbage was invented by Sir John Suckling, and gin rummy by a Brooklyn whist teacher in 1909. And yet, as he observes, people don't care who invented their favorite games, perhaps because they participate in a game differently from other activities and feel that each hand or round is "theirs" rather than an artist's. (This is, in fact, what many artists of open theatre and public "play" sculpture programmatically seek: the anonymity of the creator and the public's self-discovery.)

Sackson is probably right in saying that "this is the most productive time in the history of games." The games Sackson writes about are a part of our technology and share its glories (even to being mostly patented instead of copyrighted). As Claude Lévi-Strauss observed in *The Savage Mind*, "The game produces events by means of a structure; and we can therefore understand why competitive games flourish in our industrial societies." Games are miniature production structures.

In that case, the game of wei-ch'i, one of the oldest in the world, can be called descriptive of the Chinese technology of the Han dynasty (206 B.C. to

8 A.D.), even if yet popular, according to Scott A. Boorman, with Chinese "generals, statesmen, and literati." It is Mr. Boorman's interesting thesis that the revolutionary guerrilla strategy of Mao Tse-tung, from the birth of the Red Army in 1927 to the international program of the 1960s, can be abstractly plotted in terms of this ancient game. The book is in the tradition of other cold-war scholarship which has attempted to appropriate games as "simulation models" for political and military situations.

Wei-ch'i is known in Europe and America mainly by its Japanese name "go." Its board is a grid of nineteen intersecting horizontal and vertical lines. Its pieces are 181 black and 180 white "stones" which the players place in turns on any of the 361 intersections. Once played, stones are not moved except when "captured" and taken off the board. The object is to enclose space, keeping the opponent off balance, spreading the stones in mosaic patterns, and gradually uniting them in complex jigsawlike linkages. An average game requires between 200 and 300 moves, and play is slow. A protracted game it is, like the "protracted war" Mao advocated in 1938 as strategy against the Japanese invasion and the even more protracted war which was the Chinese Communist Revolution.

Boorman cites a few references to wei-ch'i in Mao's writings, but they are simply the kind a Western general might make to chess, whether he played it or not. The analogy really rests on strategic similarities like the dispersal of forces, tactics of capture and encirclement, and ways of coordinating discontinuous patterns and maintaining initiative and surprise while being on the defensive. Boorman's best point, possibly, is that Mao's building of his revolutionary base among the peasantry instead of China's small urban proletariat, even though this was Comintern heresy, was orthodox wei-ch'i.

The situation corresponded to "handicap wei-ch'i," where the inexperienced black player (the war lords and Chiang Kai-shek forces) is given an opening advantage by being allowed to locate a number of stones unopposed near the center of the board (as equated to control or alliance with the wealth, administration and major urban centers). Mao and Chu Teh played like experienced white players in such a game, beginning on the geographic and human "edge of the board" where territory can be controlled more quickly and held with fewer pieces and where, to the surprise of novices, the greater number of intersections actually lies.

"Western analysis of Maoist revolution is severely handicapped," Boorman says, "by lack of a systematic framework, or point of view, by which

to evaluate and structure the theory and practice of that revolutionary formula." Which means, in fewer words, that the trouble with American generals is that they think like Americans; they haven't studied their enemy's language and culture. Boorman, a student of applied mathematics and Chinese at Harvard, is preparing himself to be a very different kind of strategist.

In certain respects, obviously, this book resembles the work of our think tanks and the highly abstracted "play" with human life and destiny that goes on in such places. Boorman urges the systematic analysis of wei-ch'i as a corrective to the mistakes Western armies have made in Asia. He could soon be, if he isn't already, encircled with offers of jobs from RAND, the Hudson Institute, IDA, and all the other stones (black or white?) of the American game currently in progress. His study bears out the acuity of Roger Caillois' remark that "the mathematical analysis of games turns out to be a game in itself which has only an incidental relationship to the games analyzed."

It is bizarre and yet conceivable that if Mr. Boorman is captured by the Pentagon think tanks, he might eventually find himself a true mandarin in a sparse-

ly furnished room teaching generals and cold warriors how to play wei-ch'i. (The course could even be named with a phrase from his book: "Study of the dynamics and etiology of [the seven] deficiencies in the play of the wei-ch'i beginner.") Outside, meanwhile, deeply absorbed hippies will be calculating their future movements by throwing the *I Ching*.

It is often said of the flourishing interest in Eastern religions, in Indian music and Chinese and Japanese art, that it represents some growing Orientalizing of Western culture. Whatever truth there is in this overwhelming generalization, changing tastes in games are rightfully a part of such broad cultural shifts. Just the same, interest in Chinese games has occurred before, and has not brought much Orientalizing or much Occidental understanding of Oriental culture.

A game, after all, must be based on selected abstractions of only a few of the traits of a culture. And it emphasizes these traits peculiarly. The greatest fallacies in studies of Mr. Boorman's kind can be illustrated in one simple question: what if in Peking the "simulation model" for "interpretation of capitalist imperial strategy" is Monopoly? □

Seductive Gambits

ON EXTENDED WINGS: Wallace Stevens' Longer Poems. By Helen Hennessy Vendler. Harvard University Press. 334 pp. \$7.50.

RICHARD GIANNONE

Mr. Giannone teaches English at Fordham University. He is the author of *Music in Willa Cather's Fiction* (University of Nebraska Press) and is currently writing a study of Keats.

It is apt that Wallace Stevens should have expressed his attraction to the long poem with a metaphor about love. "I find that this prolonged attention to a single subject has the same result that prolonged attention to a senora has according to the authorities," he wrote to Harriet Monroe in 1922. "All manner of favors drop from it. Only it requires a skill in the varying of the serenade that occasionally makes one feel like a Guatemalan when one particularly wants to feel like an Italian." The senora Stevens wooed turned out to be a demanding woman but also a complaisant one whose indulgence brought out in the poet-lover a skill equal to the occasion of her diverse moods. Not since Mozart has the serenade received more variations.

The senora of course is the world. Stevens' serenade, like Frost's lovers' quarrel, is an attempt to discover the world through the seductive gambits of poetry. Because the world is where we piece ourselves out, such knowledge can lead to self-discovery. Loving becomes inquiring. Serenader becomes philosopher.

The act of self-discovery which so dominates Stevens' art inspires the same pursuit in the criticism about his poetry. Studies of his work have been ample, energetic, useful. But with the exception of Frank Kermode's scattered comments on Stevens' poetic forms in *The Sense of an Ending*, criticism of this poet has gone mostly to display the critics' finding Stevens for themselves. Discovery criticism defines its obligation to suit the critic's capacity: it interprets a poet's success as far as the critic's sense of revelation is fulfilled. Stevens' poetry is sufficiently rich in material for a critic to make digging seem like a strike. By now the operation has taken on the flurry of a boom. So the best statements about Stevens have come across as manifesto, announcing his theme, locating his place in the history of ideas, presenting his philosophy. (The minor statements

stay safely close to explication and introduction.)

Helen Vendler's *On Extended Wings*, a recent study of Stevens, works another way. This study of Stevens' long poems centers around problems defined by the poetry itself: its style and form, its evolving shape. In treating these problems intelligently, Mrs. Vendler deepens the exploration of Wallace Stevens into veneration. For this reason, among others, *On Extended Wings* is valuable and special.

Her phrase "those residual satisfactions" describes the pleasure of Stevens' poetry. In the course of assaying those satisfactions her book corrects our natural, reductive inclination to equate the poet with his theme. With Wallace Stevens the correction is urgent. No observation is more harmless or more boring than that which is most often made about his poetry—i.e., that Stevens' theme is the imagination and reality. What counts is how theme is rendered, how feeling is shaped: these are the major integrations. Theme is an abstract statement of meaning, an arid issue; "residual satisfactions" implies our participation in the shaping of that meaning. Style is theme alive.

In analyzing the fundamentals of Stevens' style, the blueprint for his edifice, Mrs. Vendler often arranges the poetry by rhetorical blocks to show its visual effect. Far from violating the text, her presentation renders the spatial impulse in visual relation. Here's how she diagrams the close of "Sunday Morning" which in the *Collected Poems* comes in four even verses:

And,
in the isolation of the sky,
at evening,
casual flocks of pigeons
make ambiguous undulations
as they sink,
downward to darkness,
on extended wings.

"The final clause," Mrs. Vendler says, "floats in its own equilibrium, knowing its inevitable direction, but not hastening the drift, just as the noting eye sees the undulations but deliberately, phrase by phrase, waits to locate them in time and space before giving them a name." Mrs. Vendler's style bears felicitous witness to her authority on the subject.

Poetic length raises questions of vision and form which call for the kind of basic thinking about the meaning of length that we're not accustomed to making. Usually, we take length as a physical dimension though it's obviously more than that. Mrs. Vendler approaches the matter in two complementary ways. She shows how each long poem experiments with length and she relates each trial to Stevens' total effort.

She cites three overarching moods in the long poems. Each attends a central Stevens interest. An idiom of ecstasy affirms the joy of sheer living on earth. Another is that ardor turned inside out, an idiom of despair. A third mood attempts to reconcile the celebratory with the desolate. But we are not likely to find the first two moods unalloyed for any sustained time. A short poem, "Of Bright & Blue Birds & the Gala Sun," is a case in point.

*Some things, niño, some things are like
this,
That instantly and in themselves they
are gay
And you and I are such things, O most
miserable . . .*

*For a moment they are gay and are
a part
Of an element, the exactest element
for us,
In which we pronounce joy like a word
of our own.*

*It is there, being imperfect, and with
these things
And erudite in happiness, with nothing
learned,
That we are joyously ourselves and
we think*

*Without the labor of thought, in that
element,
And we feel, in a way apart, for a
moment, as if
There was a bright scienza outside of
ourselves,*

*A gaiety that is being, not merely
knowing,
The will to be and to be total in belief,
Provoking a laughter, an agreement,
by surprise.*


Though the speaker sets out to instruct his niño in "A gaiety that is being," the lesson is undercut not only by the "as if" syntax but by the avuncular exhaustion in the voice. Style serves as object lesson in living. The moods of ecstasy and despair are, then, critical discriminations that help to define the third, essential manner.

Mrs. Vendler calls this manner "the pensive style" and argues that Stevens' poetic growth issues from shifts within the tensions of that style. Roughly put, his stylistic evolution runs from an early exuberance in "The Comedian as the Letter C" (1923) and "Sunday Morning" (1915) through dark searches in "Le Monocle de Mon Oncle" (1918) and "Like Decorations in a Nigger Cemetery" (1935) to the recessionary starkness of "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven" (1949). "The Auroras of Autumn" (1948) is Stevens' "dazzling performance." His experimentation culminates with "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction" (1942). Here Stevens achieves an amplitude in a triad-

ic movement and a precision in a tercet stanza that epitomize the pensive style. "Notes" is an "amassing harmony" of multiple voices and rhetorics. Emotionally, it crystallizes his view of the world. The speaker can rejoice in the assumption that "Perhaps there are times of inherent excellence" while accepting the unspeakable fact "that we live in a place / That is not our own" and go on to make of that alienation an individuality: "I have not but I am and as I am, I am." Like the phrasal cadence ending "Sunday Morning," the pensive style fulfills itself in equilibrium.

But the poise is always wrested out of contending oppositions: affirmation and reservation, liberation and discipline, joy and sorrow, hope and nostalgia, life and death, beginning and ending, mind and sky, Sunday morning in a sunny chair and an ordinary evening in New Haven. Antagonistic impulses activate Stevens' mind. Mrs. Vendler writes of expansion and contraction in his style. A sweeping, sometimes unwieldy syntax, a lush diction, an exhilarated cadence, and volatile metaphors signify those moments when the persona feels at home amid the world's magnitude. Here's how Stevens presents the hero of the "Comedian" who sets out to see the world with an eye for the far-out. The style mocks, especially through its pompous prepositionality, but

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it gently recognizes that even if imaginative primness can't grasp the commonplace it does reassure.

*An eye most apt in gelatines and jupes,
Berries of villages, a barber's eye,
An eye of land, of simple salad-beds,
Of honest quilts, the eye of Crispin,
hung*

*On porpoises, instead of apricots,
And on silent porpoises, whose
snouts*

*Dibbled in waves that were
mustachios,*

*Inscrutable hair in an inscrutable
world.*

When the world's massiveness resists subjective viewing, the eye must begin to see anew. The *I* is simultaneously chastened. Then, syntax tightens, metaphors disappear, aphorisms dominate. Here's Crispin "annulled" by the tempest he thought he could stem.

Severance

*Was clear. The last distortion of
romance*

*Forsook the insatiable egotist. The sea
Severs not only lands but also selves.
Here was no help before reality.*

As with style so with form, the implications of which *On Extended Wings* might have pursued more extensively. Every long poem presents a grand issue modestly: a spiritual crisis as a woman breakfasts on a "Sunday Morning"; the nature of love through an uncle's monologue; the truthfulness of perception in looking at a blackbird thirteen ways; an *ars poetica* from *Owl's Clover*; a theory of the imagination from a blue guitarist; a supreme fiction moved toward by means of notes; faith pictured in summer's credences; our mind's extraordinary darkness glossed in the ordinariness of a New Haven evening.

Each presentation develops through an open movement of the mind. Against this freedom, Stevens places a prosodic regularity. His stanzaic design ranges from couplets in "The Man with the Blue Guitar" through sonnetlike cantos of eleven lines ("Le Monocle"), fourteen ("Examination of the Hero in a Time of War"), and fifteen ("Sunday Morning"). Two long poems are exceptions. The "Comedian" and "Esthétique du Mal" have verse paragraphs of varying lengths. Even in these poems, however, Stevens organizes his poetry through varied internal strategies like the tercet. The point is that every long poem has particular rhetorical and metrical blocks which are units of contraction and serve to restrain.

In the form of the long poem I find an analogue to the antithesis Mrs. Vendler observes in Stevens' style: an impulse of prosodic closure pressing free mental activity. The cumulative effect is dialectical interplay. This is how man thinks,

what Stevens means by "The poem of the mind in the act of finding / What will suffice." Poetic length signifies a psychic dimension, the space for searching. The persona moves associatively, flinging out questions, assumptions, desires, or devastations on the world that is not his own but all he has. The search invariably ends in irresolution with the object of pursuit suspended in inaccessibility (a supreme fiction) or clipped in mid-pursuit (a beloved). But the value of the quest is affirmed. The persona is brought further along in the "constant secondariness" that is selfhood.

Crispin's sea change and the moral course of all Stevens' personae are excursions behind the brow. Stevens measures spiritual breadth by poetic length. The form of the long poem expresses the shifting progress toward selfhood. Stevens trusts poetry because it "helps us to live our lives." As a model, his poetry signifies many things. Its elaborate syntax traces the chance and indirection that are discovery. Its conciseness marks the impact of awareness. The stylistic pre-

cision emblemizes the perfection we move toward and fulfill ourselves in, but never reach. We are not all we say, or all we can say. We learn to let the supreme fiction stay supreme. Knowing what's beyond us helps us to accept where we are. Imperfection has its consolations.

The expansive thrust in the long poem implies possibility, openness, liberation, renewal. Expansion accounts for the fact of death by refusing to end. The adjustments imposed on the mind reveal that ideas are half-truths requiring modification or enlargement by their inherent opposites. Such skeptical wisdom fortifies us in facing the final blankness at the center, "this sadness without cause." Without cause, but with a beautiful consequence. We cherish others, savor otherness. Stevens puts this moment in the living infinity of the present tense:

*Each person completely touches us
With what he is and as he is,
In the stale grandeur of annihilation.*

The serenade of love to one's senora becomes an improvisation into self. □

THEATRE / Harold Clurman

The first exhibit I saw on my return from Los Angeles, *The Last Sweet Days of Isaac*, "a 1970 musical"—in two parts—had opened a few days earlier (East-side Playhouse). The critics had gone crazy over it: they raved. I am only slightly surprised that at this writing, only nine days after seeing the show, I can barely remember its plots.

The book and lyrics are by Gretchen Cryer, the music by Nancy Ford and a rock band calling itself *The Zeitgeist* furnishes the instrumental accompaniment. The two main players, Austin Pendleton and Fredricka Weber, with a happy assist by John Long, are very nice. The set by Ed Wittstein is handsomely efficient and Word Baker's direction is excellent. The musical leadership and arrangements by Clay Fullum are suavely expert, providing soothing sounds in the tender moments and the required blare in the dramatic.

As I recall it, the first part of the double bill titled "The Elevator" takes place in one; a young man and a girl are trapped in the cubicle. The young man, Isaac, is a poetic being intent on photographing all the high moments of his daily experience; he believes every second of life is fraught with beauty and significance, if we would only lend ourselves to it. The girl is skeptical. Though married she's "unawakened," however Isaac's fervor is momentarily persuasive

and she allows herself in a well-staged and quite funny bit of business to be all but stripped by him. Nothing remarkable happens after that. The elevator begins to work again; the girl comes down to earth. Life for her will move along its customary tracks.

Not so with Isaac. He's jailed in the second skit, "I Want to Walk to San Francisco," for having thrown himself on the street in protest against something or other. Most of this part of the evening is given over to his addressing first the girl and then his mother over a television set. The point here, you see, is that our lives have now become little more than communication through mechanical media. Isaac dies in the end for all the world to see—and enjoy.

If I haven't got these "stories" straight—and I probably haven't—it doesn't matter much: a general impression remains. The piece is wistfully querulous and sentimentally humorous, suggesting an adolescent yearning for more fulfillment in living, more intimacy of contact between individuals. The songs—one of which begins "Touching your hand is like touching your mind"—are short, as are their ideas. The music washes soapyly around them and miniscule darts of naughty frankness and social irony spice the dish with juvenile sophistication. The evening is almost something and never much of anything. But this "almost" is

enough to drive certain folk wild with delight. The middle-aged have grown very, very young.

If juvenilia is rendered as tart candy in "Isaac," it becomes horrendous in another hit, *Child's Play* (Royale). Though a thriller, it too is kid stuff. It is Robert Marasco's first play. His future work may indicate whether besides skill he has talent.

The production is Hitchcock-smooth. The set and lighting by Jo Mielziner are impressive—there is oppression in the ponderous beams, staircase, furnishings, while the lighting glows with cavernous glamour befitting the sense of dread the author conspires to evoke. The direction by Joseph Hardy paves the way carefully for something awful. And much that is awful occurs. All the parts are well played: besides Pat Hingle and Fritz Weaver, there are two new faces in the cast, those of Ken Howard and David Rounds, which are especially welcome.

The scene is a Catholic secondary school for boys. There is trouble in the place, terror in fact. Sadistic and masochistic violence is rampant. The boys torture one another: the victims seem to invite the cruelty practiced upon them. Even the pleasant, uncomplicated gym teacher is moved to cut his hand deliberately with a piece of broken glass. We never learn why. It is part of the taken-for-granted "mystery" that the school is infected with evil.

Perhaps the audience accepts this because we assume nowadays that wickedness is a norm, especially among the young. It need not be explained, it is just so. There may be a vicarious pleasure for the audience in the play's male-factions: it is fun, as was the killing of Christians for the Romans. Perhaps it is the audience which is evil—beset by the evil of stupidity.

That may be grossly unfair. It turns out—a surprise!—that of the two lay teachers, one unusually severe, the other gently permissive, it is the latter who is the corrupt one and most hated by the boys. They would tear him asunder before our eyes if the curtain didn't come down in time. What are we to gather from this? Are we to infer that too bland a benevolence inspires a need for the drama of violence, that gratuitous mayhem is the consequence and product of complacent ease?

An interesting thesis, but no such theme, or any other, is developed. Shivers are induced for their own sake. Meaningless in themselves, they keep the spectator on the verge of something that insinuates more. The writing is slick; there are humorous touches. (When the churchmen are shown to be "human," that is, as ornery or as cynically disheartened as the rest of us, the audience

just loves it.) And, I repeat, the production is most clever.

It is an indignity to submit to the spectacle of ugliness without a compensating reason for doing so. When praise is bestowed on such a contrivance it is always in the name of "good theatre." If this is "good theatre," to hell with it. It is only crafty hooley.

The title of Jules Feiffer's new play *The White House Murder Case* (Circle in the Square) portends melodrama, but it is an extravagant farce—at times very funny. It has a satirical edge, obviated rather than enhanced by scenes which are more painful than mirth-provoking.

Satire is leveled at the top rungs of governmental and military power. A future war against Brazil is imagined. By hazard and all-around bumbling, nerve gas is employed by our army and 700 American soldiers are killed. The President and his Cabinet gather to determine how the mishap occurred. The answer is not forthcoming because it is not seriously sought. What concerns their eminences is how the news shall be unembarrassingly transmitted to the public. While the deliberations go on, the President's wife, an outspoken liberal, threatens to spill the beans to the press, but she is murdered by some unknown person—ostensibly a "radical." The President undertakes an investigation within the Cabinet.

In the panic which ensues, it becomes clear that these politicians are heartless jerks, unreliable automatons, ludicrous monsters, interested only in holding their positions. Good jokes and mad gags keep the evening lively. One scene in particular, in which each of the men in turn appears to be the guilty party, is truly hilarious—in large part due to the boisterous fancifulness of Alan Arkin's direction. But there is always the danger in such high jinks that their very success diminishes their satiric impact. This, by the way, did not happen in Feiffer's earlier and superior play, *Little Murders*.

The contrapuntal scenes on the battlefield, which interrupt the main line of action, produce some comic moments and imaginative flashes. They wobble between near lyric metaphor and nihilistic bitterness, an alternation of mood that damages the play's unity and impedes full satisfaction. There is a miscalculation of effect. The mockery, symptomatic of hate, misses its aim. Still this is by no means a play to be dismissed.

The acting is nearly all caricature which two actors—Paul Benedict and J. J. Barry—keep most steadily in balance. In this vein Alan Arkin's direction is remarkably adept and inventive.

Norman. Is That You? by Ron Clark and Sam Bobrick (Lyceum) is a

"laff show" about the owner of a dry cleaning store and his wife from Dayton, Ohio, who discover on a visit to New York that their son is a homosexual. By the final curtain the parents have accepted their offspring's disposition and hope that on his return from the army he will make a suitable "marriage" to a good man—maybe even to a lawyer or a doctor!

Call this silly, cheap or any other disparaging thing you will, there is something harmlessly funny about the play. It contains a quotient of common sense: it accepts queerness as a natural fact rather than as alarming. I prefer this approach, even in its crass humors, to the clinical, the hortatory, the tearful, the indignant or the "lofty" treatment. If there were more such "vulgarity" on the subject there might be fewer plays in which homosexuality is projected as a daring, scandalizing, controversial matter, an attitude I find really sickening. I laughed with the rest of the polloi.

This spoof is well acted—the two younger men, Martin Huston and Walter Willison, have been wisely cast. Lou Jacobi as the astonished papa makes honest foolishness, well-meaning obtuseness, loud-mouthed bewilderment and the ignorant man's fundamental rectitude both screamingly absurd and unaccountably lovable. Maureen Stapleton's pathetic innocence and constant surprise at the incomprehensibility of practically everything is under all circumstances as touching as it is tickling. □

ART

LAWRENCE ALLOWAY

Ever since Thomas Hoving went to the Metropolitan, far too many of the museum's exhibitions have ranged between the trivial and the disastrous. By his continuous visibility as director, Mr. Hoving has attracted to himself the blame for an overtouted and underachieving exhibition schedule. Matters have reached the point at which last month it was first-page news on the second section of *The New York Times*, when some trees on Fifth Avenue were felled as part of the museum's renovation. "We were wrong," he was quoted as saying, although the museum had permission from Hoving's successor in the Parks Department to remove the trees. Feeling that anti-Hoving sentiment had reached absurdity, I am pleased to record that the Met has now done something very well, the exhibition called "The Year 1200." One reason for its excellence may be that the subject is one about which Mr. Hoving is himself well informed. Before he went

to the Parks Department he was director of the Metropolitan branch museum, The Cloisters, and the present show, a carefully calibrated display of medieval art, is based on knowledge rather than on political zeal or on a clumsy desire to be a swinger.

It is a real pleasure to see a major exhibition on a subject that one did not know existed. "The Year 1200" is the "chronological center" of a forty-year period between the Romanesque and the Gothic, but one not to be described as merely transitional, according to Konrad Hoffmann's introductory essay. How to define this newly identified area? It has to do particularly, in figure compositions, with, to quote Dr. Hoffman, "spatial and corporeal dynamism" and "psychological animation." The rigidities of the preceding Romanesque style are dissolved into physically real and psychologically nuanced figures. He is less precise on the differences from the succeeding style, except to emphasize that there is an intensity and an internal logic in the art of Northwest Europe for this forty years which is absolutely homogeneous, and distinct from the general profile of early Gothic, usually reckoned from 1140 or so.

The exhibition is the reverse of all those large shows devoted to big stylistic

units, the Baroque style, the Gothic period. The function of the show is to determine precisely the identity of a previously vague or unknown phase of the arts. By doing this the show concentrates attention on the pieces shown because they are, literally, being seen in this way for the first time, in the company of relevant objects. What we have is the portable part of a style which needs absent architectural works for its full definition. Hence an international symposium scheduled for this month and a forthcoming book on *The Year 1200: A Background Survey* will give contextual background to the 350-page list of exhibits already published.

Most of the objects shown are either small or incomplete: the small, intact, precious pieces are usually ivories, enamels, illuminated manuscripts and metalwork, whereas the fragmented works are sculpture, stained glass and frescoes. Typical of the larger pieces is the headless figure of an Apostle, found in the Seine, not too far from Notre Dame, and presumably ditched there in the French Revolution. Even the ivories may be mutilated: the catalogue draws attention to "the enchanting intimacy that characterizes the group" of a Madonna and Child, for example, both figures being, again, headless. The show assumes considerable sophistication in the inspection of small-scale objects and of fragments: heads or bodies or sections of bodies and noseless heads. The weight of the argument for definition is carried by the enamels, ivories and manuscripts, rather than by the paintings and sculptures that we are accustomed to in major exhibitions. In particular the enamels and manuscripts give a populous inventory of freshly humanized figures, dynamically free even as they inhabit the formally binding zones assigned them on intricate pages and compartmented caskets and shrines.

Hoving, in a foreword to the catalogue, refers to his hopes for "a distinguished scholarly (and popular!) exhibition on the development and scope of Style 1200." It appears that the scholarly end is taken care of, but what of the Pop side? The mere fact that it is a major activity at the Met will insure the show a certain level of public attendance, probably enough to satisfy sensible box-office requirements. The steps toward popularization that I noticed are a film on Chartres cathedral that runs all day, and some fancy decor. The latter raises a serious problem that needs to be discussed, since this is not the first time distinguished art has been embedded in trashy display at the Metropolitan ("The Great Age of Fresco," two years ago, was another).

Architecturally, the Met is an old-fashioned museum, which is to say that

it has flights of steps and suites of tall rooms; it has resources of stateliness but not of intimacy. Since, in the present exhibition, everything is small and needs to be peered at, if the details of this new style are to be discerned, the organizers are faced with a problem. How to present small objects in high halls? It is awkward to focus spotlights across long distances, and to overcome this difficulty the installation designer worked out a way to get the lamps near the objects. Instead of a short stand with a glass box at eye level, the stands have been inverted, as it were, and drop great distances from the ceiling to terminate in display cases. Lighting and suspension are all held within the plunging column, so that the bright objects are at their accustomed height but in inverted structures. The intention, to quote a press release, is "to convey the feeling of the medieval period without trying to re-create or copy it." The dangling display cases are said to be "inspired by the clusters of columns in cathedrals of the period." Upside-down columns? Actually the effect, as so often in the Met's displays, is overbearing and vulgar, conferring a Buck Rogers-type drama on the precious artifacts. Suddenly it's 2001 instead of 1200.

The fallacy of the imitative environment in museum presentation is shown again in the treatment of the stained glass. Though clearly lit from behind the bits and pieces are scattered and embedded in the walls of an enclosed space that looks like a minichapel out of Le Corbusier at Ronchamp. Apart from their common twelve-hundredness the fragments of glass come from different places in France, England and Germany. Their unification in a spurious religious layout is not only a cheap display device; it vitiates the concreteness of the objects themselves. The catalogue is full of pinpoint observation that invites us to be more exact than we have been about the works of the period. Why then need the display be souped up, in terms of a generalized medievalism, which points away from precision toward evocation? The answer, presumably, is that this is Hoving's design department in a participatory (and popular) mode. □

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
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FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

- 1 Perhaps a mechanical device in the form of a tin can cover. (11)
- 9 See 11 across
- 10 Stretch as far as this, where a church holds it. (5)
- 11 and 9 The character of the first person before the venerable type? (4,4)
- 12 Sounds like the city could hold a dangerous load! (4,3)
- 13 See 25 down
- 15 Snap, perhaps, to disengage. (5,3)
- 16 See 14 down
- 18 A student might have to work for what is given at some stores. (6)
- 21 Stirring up a rather large number in leaving? (8)
- 24 Built up the same sad sort! (7)
- 26 Candied fruit or nuts. (7)
- 28 Defense made possible by smashing the atom? (4)
- 29 Those who are told to 25, 13 and 23 should look it! (5)
- 30 Is it most important to make an entrance like a rogue? (4)
- 31 By getting an inbred version, one might, like an orator. (11)

DOWN

- 2 How chess-players cogitate! Man, this way it's a crisis! (9)
- 3 To sort of adorn something suggesting the shape of a funnel. (7)
- 4 One in the lead could be terrible! (4)
- 5 Has it an anagram for people? (7)

- 6 30 could be made to fit to a T, all according to plan. (5)
- 7 It could have taken a pile to design the Louvre! (6)
- 8 Take on a job right next to the guard? (6)
- 14, 20 down and 16 across Could have been a popular song, but now it's too late to tell whether it could have been a hit. (5,3,4,2,4)
- 17 The current isn't being followed with such. (3,2-4)
- 19 Might press the charge of your neighbor, a Mr. O'Day. (6)
- 20 See 14 down
- 22 What surrounding attackers might do, when this. (5,2)
- 23 See 25 down
- 25, 13 across and 23 down What the convalescent might do, even if cold drinks are forbidden! (3,2,3,4,6)
- 27 You'll find it useful in climbing. (4)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1335

ACROSS: 9 Eyeball; 10 Sackbut; 12 Can; 13 Peace; 14 Doctors; 16 Comical; 18 Stand-in; 21 Manages; 24 and 11 Inner tubes; 26 War; 28 and 5 across Pontine Marshes; 29 and 1 across Gives no quarter; 30 Restore; 31 Scrapes. DOWN: 1 Quested; 2 Alembic; 3 Tears; 4 Relicts; 5 Masonic; 6 Recap; 7 Hebraic; 8 Sitwell; 15, 17 and 27 across Old Man River; 18 Slipper; 19 Awnings; 20 Nowhere; 21 Mirages; 22 Gives up; 23 Sermons; 25 Rhino; 27 Rover.

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